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CeaseFire:  Breaking Through the Impenetrable Gang World to Eradicate 
Violence 
Chapter 1: Viewing Gang Violence Through a Different Lens 
Gang violence is a pervasive issue that adversely affects urban populations 
such as Cape Town.   Though such violence is rooted in poor inner-city slums, its 
effects are far-reaching, with violence spilling over into other realms of society.  
Gang violence tears apart families and leaves communities to live in constant fear 
and intimidation of gangs.
1
   Numerous violence prevention initiatives have been 
developed throughout the decades to combat gangsterism and gang violence, yet no 
long-lasting strategy has been achieved thus far.
2
  Various explanations have been 
put forth as to why these programs are ultimately unsustainable, yet the same types 
of programs continuously re-emerge, only to be shut down because they have no 
appreciable effect on gang violence.  Over the decades, a pattern of violence and 
violence prevention has developed.  Typically, a spate of killings related to gang 
warfare occurs, the community’s outcry leads to a short-term solution and the 
problem is temporarily abated.  Within months, however, violence erupts yet again.   
 This failed pattern repeats itself because the response to gang violence 
revolves around two core principles – the community must become more active and 
involved with curbing gang violence, and law enforcement must be tougher on 
policing and apprehending the offenders.
3
  Absent from these solutions is the very 
source of the problem itself, fully engaging gangsters in a long-term solution to end 
the violence.  Short-term solutions involve gang members in a very limited way, and 
only after a particularly notorious incident of gang violence has already occurred.  
For example, gang members have been repeatedly called upon to enter into conflict 
mediation and peace pacts so as to end gang warfare.  As a result of these pacts, 
violence temporarily desists for a few months.  However, no other support systems 
are put into place to ensure that the peace continues, and ultimately, violence breaks 
out again.  Gang members have also been approached to engage in other pursuits 
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besides gang activity, such as becoming involved in local football teams.  Again, 
such solutions are merely hasty and immediate answers that avoid the more deeply-
rooted and complex issues that these young adults face on a day-to-day basis.
4
  
Playing football for a few hours does not address the problem of broken homes, drug 
addiction, and the trauma that comes with living in a violent culture.
5
  Nonetheless, 
the community sees any sort of engagement with gangs as a last resort to stopping 
crime and no attempts are made to have gang members reintegrate into society.  
Rather, the problem is seen as a war between gangs and the community.     
 The other traditional solution, besides community involvement, is tougher 
law enforcement.  However, the lack of manpower and resources available to the 
police, compounded with the fact that the police are viewed with suspicion in the 
Cape Flats, makes more effective law enforcement also difficult to sustain.
6
  
Frustrated with the inappropriate response to gang violence by the police, 
communities have resorted to taking the law into their own hands, with 
organisations such as PAGAD forming.  However, having organisations carry out 
their own form of vigilante justice can be dangerous.
7
  These organisations have 
been known to respond to gang violence by attacking gang members themselves, 
and the consequence has been that violence continued unabated.   
Such previous tactics focus on the notion that gangsters are thugs or skollies, 
who are condemned to a life of delinquency and violence.  The tendency has been to 
pit the community against gangsters, and if gangs were to be a part of any solution, 
it must be with their minimal involvement.  However, gang members need much 
more support by the community if gang violence is to be reduced.  What is needed is 
a holistic community approach that centres around and actively includes gang 
members.
8
  Rather than just dealing with gangsters in a minimal fashion, it is 
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necessary to engage them and motivate them to change themselves.  CeaseFire
9
 is 
one such program that looks at gangsters in this light and is ground-breaking in its 
work.  This paper evaluates the CeaseFire model within the context of the South 
African community that it operates in, Hanover Park.  The CeaseFire model can 
work, because any community approach to addressing gang violence must include 
reaching out to gang members themselves.  However, as the model itself affirms, 
this approach can only work within the context of an integrated community 
response.    
 I begin this paper by establishing and explaining the CeaseFire model.  I 
discuss the features that make it unique to other violence prevention initiatives, and 
ultimately, why the model can be a successful, sustainable approach to the gang 
violence issue in Cape Town.  I further trace the origination of the model to its roots 
in Chicago.  I argue that Chicago shares similar issues with Cape Town in regards to 
gang violence, which is why incorporating the model in Hanover Park can yield 
similar and successful results.  In fact, many of the gangs in Chicago are comprised 
primarily of certain races, blacks and Latinos.  Likewise, Cape Town’s gangs are 
comprised of coloureds.   Both cities incarcerate large amounts of gang members 
and have spent significant resources combating gang violence.  Cape Town is 
therefore an ideal candidate for adopting a program that has been proven successful 
at battling violence in Chicago.  I will next discuss how CeaseFire is implemented in 
Cape Town, within the township of Hanover Park, and the differences between 
Chicago and Hanover Park that must be taken into account when tailoring the 
program to the needs of the community.   
Because CeaseFire emphasizes the importance of adapting the model to the 
community that it serves, an examination of how gangs developed in Hanover Park 
must be taken into consideration.   Only by viewing Hanover Park’s history can the 
model successfully incorporate cultural and societal norms specific to that area.  In 
addition to Hanover Park’s history, unique factors that have led to gang violence 
within Hanover Park must also be taken into account by the community’s CeaseFire 
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program.  One such notable factor is the influence of prison gang culture.  While it is 
common for gangsters in both Chicago and Hanover Park to have served time in 
prison, Cape Town gangsters are much more likely to be recruited into a prison 
gang.  These gangs carry an elite status and reputation on the streets and are an 
important issue that CeaseFire Hanover Park must address when dealing with gang 
violence.
10
   Finally, in order for CeaseFire Hanover Park to be successful, it must 
work with other external organisations, and I examine possible cooperating 
organisations.  I conclude by addressing the prospects for CeaseFire Hanover Park 
and make recommendations as to the course that it should follow in order to 
continue to be sustainable. 
1A: Limitations 
The scope of this paper was limited to articles, studies, and research that 
have already been conducted on the Ceasefire model.  No interviews with 
programme participants or community partners were included in this body of work.  
However, in order to facilitate further discussion on the topic of Ceasefire as an 
effective violence prevention model, it is necessary to gain the first-hand insight that 
programme participants and affiliates have.  Only by engaging in such dialogue will 
a more complete picture of the Ceasefire model in Hanover Park be obtained.   
Further, limited studies exist which focus on violence-reduction rates that are 
attributable to Ceasefire.   This is due to a variety of factors, including the nature of 
defining success.  Merely looking at declining numbers of violence and homicide 
within a given area do not portray the full effects of the programme. Therefore, 
additional studies on Ceasefire's success rates within Chicago must be undertaken, 
and are beyond the focus of this paper.            
 
 
Chapter 2: Establishing the Model 
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The CeaseFire model has been successful in cities such as Chicago not only 
because it focuses on involving gang members in the process of combating violence, 
but also because it looks at the issue of gangsterism in a whole new light.   The 
CeaseFire model differentiates itself from other violence prevention methods by 
examining the gang violence issue from a public health perspective.
11
  Instead of 
depicting gang violence as a problem that is brought on by gangsters against 
innocent community members, and thereby targeting gang members, CeaseFire 
refocuses the problem back onto gang violence itself.
12
  Gang violence is viewed as 
a disease.
13
  Therefore, any successful model to combat the disease will focus on 
disease control and eradication.
14
  This notion is central to CeaseFire’s mission, 
which states that CeaseFire is founded upon reversing the spread of violence by 
using strategies associated with disease control, such as detection and interruption, 
identifying individuals involved in transmission, and changing social norms of the 
communities where it occurs.
15
  
Under this approach, certain gang members are seen as most likely to cause 
an event that is infectious, which then further transmits the disease of violence to 
other gang members.
16
  If one gang member shoots a rival gang member, then this 
action elicits a response from the rival gang and someone else will shoot in 
retaliation.  The result is gang warfare.  CeaseFire identifies the potential infectious 
agents – or influential gangsters – and works on changing their behavioural and 
social norms, so as to curb any risk of infection.
17
  Oftentimes, these norms are 
related to the environmental conditions that gangsters find themselves in.   
By looking at gang violence as a disease, the model takes the blame away 
from gangsters themselves.  It does not vilify gangsters; rather, it places them as 
central figures in the fight against gang violence.
18
  Gang members are merely the 
carriers for the real evil – crime and violence.  Violence is categorized with diseases 
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such as HIV, tuberculosis, and other contagious diseases.
19
  These ‘evils’ are not 
embodied in one group of people; they are social issues unto themselves that must 
be dealt with by the entire community in order to be eradicated.
20
   Public health 
workers relied on various methods to engage the community in addressing these 
types of diseases and to become aware of the causes of infection.
21
  Similarly, in 
order to combat the disease of violence, specialized workers and tools must be used 
to address the community.  Under the CeaseFire model, these workers come in the 
form of outreach workers and violence interrupters.
22
  As the CeaseFire paradigm 
recognizes, no real solution to gang violence can occur without the aid of gangsters 
themselves.  By removing the negative connotation that being a gangster means that 
one is automatically a ‘skollie,’ CeaseFire attempts to empower gangsters and make 
them a part of the solution to end violence.  Furthermore, gang members figure 
prominently in the model’s framework, which is comprised of five major 
components - youth outreach, community mobilization, public awareness, faith 
based leader involvement, and criminal justice participation.
23
  Recognizing the fact 
that gang members are the ‘carriers’ of violence, CeaseFire employs both outreach 
workers and violence interrupters to work with high-risk gang members so as to 
‘interrupt the transmission of violence’.
24
 
Critics of CeaseFire argue that such a model cannot be incorporated from one 
city to another, as each city has its own specific gang issues and gang culture, and no 
'cookie-cutter' model can be implemented universally.
25
  Yet the model recognizes 
the importance of adapting itself to each of the cities that it is involved in.
26
  Though 
there is one central headquarters for all the CeaseFire sites throughout the world, 
each community that adopts the model is responsible for tailoring it to meet their 
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community’s needs.   The headquarters then acts as a guide and source of support 
for these branches.  Specifically, CeaseFire’s main overseeing headquarters is 
located at the University of Illinois in Chicago’s School of Public Health.
27
  At the 
University of Illinois site, the program is administered through the Chicago Project 
for Violence Prevention – or CPVP.  CPVP is responsible for a wide variety of 
duties, including developing and implementing the program, training local sites, and 
coordinating national public education campaigns.  As part of its implementation 
role, CPVP decides which community organisations will host the program within 
their community, in order to ensure that the community will run a successful 
CeaseFire program on its own.   
Once a local site has been selected, CPVP steps back and serves as a support 
and monitoring system for the local site.  The aim is to keep the model as organic to 
the community as possible.
28
  The initial involvement of CPVP is meant to help the 
local organisation set up its own CeaseFire program.  CPVP also ensures that no 
more than one site is established in any given community, so as to avoid duplicating 
services.  CPVP further decides which community has the most amount of need for 
the program.  This need is primarily based on the level of gang activity and violence 
that occurs.
29
  However, the model can only work if a local community organisation 
has the ability to also implement the program, as well.  Often, the local organisation 
will have limited resources and staffs that are also needed to serve the organisation’s 
own needs.  Because the local site must be able to take the CeaseFire model and 
apply it on its own, CPVP evaluates whether the local organisation has the 
appropriate amount of capacity to additionally manage a CeaseFire program.
30
   
2A: The Pillars of the Model 
CeaseFire is based on five main pillars: community mobilisation, youth 
outreach, public education, faith-based leader involvement, and criminal justice 
participation.  Each of these pillars is designed to incorporate the community as a 
whole to address gang violence.
31
  This includes integrating gang members back into 
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society to combat violence.  Under traditional violence prevention initiatives, 
gangsters themselves were seen to be at odds with the community, and were 
therefore never an integral part to any solution.
32
  CeaseFire is distinguishable from 
these traditional approaches because it recognizes that gang members, as carriers of 
the disease, need to have an adequate support system in place so as to stop the 
transmission of violence.
33
  Gang members are fighting the same battle as the 
community, and they must be included in a sustainable violence prevention 
initiative.   
Part of the support system implemented by CeaseFire involves assigning 
outreach workers to extremely high-risk gang members.  These gang members are 
chosen due to how many high-risk criteria they meet.  The criteria include whether 
or not the gang member has been to jail, whether he is in school, and whether he 
owns a firearm. Instead of isolating such individuals, CeaseFire chooses to fully 
engage with them.
34
  An outreach worker is given the responsibility to meet with 
these gang members regularly and link them with services that they might need, 
such as counselling, rehabilitation services, or anger management classes.  In 
addition, outreach workers provide gang members daily support in finding 
alternatives to using violence.
35
  For example, many gang members are unemployed 
and are not in school, and therefore do not have structure in their lives.  Outreach 
workers assist gang members with job applications and transportation to and from 
job interviews, as well as enrolling them in classes.
36
  The use of such workers 
stands in stark contrast to various violence prevention efforts that do not address the 
underlying issues which face inner-city youth today, such as lack of opportunities, 
alcohol and substance addictions, and family issues.  Moreover, workers are a much 
needed source of support to gang members, and can help facilitate their clients to 
make positive choices that do not revolve around crime.   
Violence interrupters are an additional needed support to gangsters and are 
another distinguishing feature of the model.  Interrupters function as conflict 
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mediators and crisis workers.
37
  In contrast to outreach workers, interrupters do not 
work on a 9 to 5 schedule and rather respond to potential conflict situations as 
needed.
38
  Because of their more flexible schedules, interrupters can respond to 
situations quickly and work to diffuse a situation before it becomes out of control.  
Though they are not law enforcement, they serve a vital community need by 
working to quell a possibly violent situation, without having to first call the police.  
Moreover, violence interrupters are often reformed gang members themselves, and 
gang members are more likely to trust and listen to them because of their shared 
experiences with gang culture.
39
     
Getting gang members the assistance they need is just one step in creating a 
holistic approach to addressing violence.  The other major player in the CeaseFire 
model is the entire community itself.  Without community mobilization, the program 
cannot be successful.
40
  CeaseFire recognizes that no long-term approach to 
eradicating gang violence can occur if the community does not have an active role in 
the process.
41
  CeaseFire advocates specific ways of incorporating the community in 
responses to gang violence.  Most notably, when a gang shooting occurs, a prayer 
vigil and a rally are to be held within 72 hours of the event.  The rally and vigil are 
open to everyone, including gang members, and various community residents are 
invited to speak.
42
  The rallies are held in open spaces, and the idea is that gang 
members who have partaken or are thinking of partaking in violence will realize the 
effect that violence has on the community.
43
  Holding such rallies is crucial to the 
community, as violence inspires a whole gamut of emotions to become unleashed, 
ranging from fear to anger.
44
  The community feels intimidation and threat at the 
prospect of retaliatory shootings, where potentially innocent bystanders can become 
harmed.  Simultaneously, community members desire that the perpetrators of 
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violence be brought to justice, whether it is by the police or some other form of law 
enforcement.
45
  By giving the community a platform to speak out against violence, 
CeaseFire also allows community members to channel their anger and grief over the 
crimes that occur within the neighbourhood, without having to resort to violence 
against the perceived cause of the harm. 
The model demonstrates the importance of providing a space for people to 
voice their emotions.  It incorporates these emotions into a catalyst, where the 
community response can transform into a source of hope for stopping future 
violence.  This hope leads to mobilization, where community members can decide 
how they can play a role to stop violence and how they can work with together.
46
  
Unlike past violence prevention programs, however, CeaseFire does not rely solely 
on the community outcry or on a particular bloody instance of gang warfare that has 
garnered media attention.  Rather, CeaseFire continuously engages in conflict 
mediations and supports gang members who want to reform, regardless of whether 
the community calls for action.  By holding prayer vigils and rallies, CeaseFire has 
found a unique way to incorporate the community into its own mission.   
Community mobilization also entails public awareness.  In accordance with 
the idea that violence itself is the ro t of the problem, the model holds that, like 
other communicable diseases, violence cannot be controlled without knowledge of 
the disease.
47
  Through public education, CeaseFire attempts to alter the public’s 
perception of gang members as skollies, and instead tries to reshape the discussion 
around violence as a curable disease.  CeaseFire engages its employees to go door-
to-door to distribute flyers regarding the statistics of shootings and what can be done 
to stop the violence.  A massive media campaign is also part of this strategy, where 
various media outlets are contacted to attend prayer vigils and community events.
48
  
In order to grab public attention, the model utilizes catchy slogans and pictures, as 
well.  In Chicago, for example, the most popular slogan is simply the words, ‘Don’t 
Shoot: I want to grow up.’  A picture of a young, sad black boy in front of a solid 
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black background is displayed underneath those words.
49
  The advertisements 
display the contact number and website for CeaseFire, and these advertisements are 
then printed on banners, flyers, stickers, and posted throughout the community.  
Such marketing strategies serve a dual role, they inform the community and the 
public-at-large that CeaseFire is a violence prevention initiative that can be utilized, 
and they also inform gang members that they can get help and play a role in 
breaking the pattern of violence.  It is important to note that these campaigns do not 
attack gangsters.  Slogans such as “don’t shoot” are meant to be seen as an appeal, 
and are meant to help gang members realize that their actions affect a very 
vulnerable part of their community.  An emphasis is constantly placed on making 
sure that gang members are seen as part of the solution to the problem.  They 
themselves have to be engaged in the process of eradicating violence, and the media 
campaign is designed to invite them to the table.            
Despite media campaigns and violence-response events, programs such as 
CeaseFire cannot successfully engage the community without also obtaining the 
assistance of prominent leaders within the area.  Reaching out to community leaders 
is also another way to bridge the divide between gangsters and the community.  
Community leaders can take various forms, but consistently, these leaders are found 
in the churches, mosques, and synagogues within the neighbourhood.
50
  Though 
CeaseFire is non-denominational, it recognizes the impact that faith-based leaders 
have on shaping change.
51
  In addition to being well-respected in the community, 
faith-based leaders also serve as vital guides for gang members looking to make a 
change in their own lives.
52
  Many other sustainable forms of interventions have also 
utilized this branch of the community.  A famous example of this is Alcoholics 
Anonymous, where several of the tenets of its 12-step program incorporate God and 
faith into achieving and maintaining sobriety.
53
  Faith-based leaders provide 
guidance and affirmation that there is a higher power and many gang members who 
are trying to reform rely on this higher power to help them through their struggles.
54
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 Churches and mosques also are very active in their neighbourhoods, with 
various religious groups organizing community events and fund-raisers to increase 
membership and foster community unity.  While community members may not be 
involved in any other type of organisation, most are affiliated with their 
neighbourhood religious institution.  By including faith-based leader involvement as 
one of its core components, CeaseFire reaffirms the importance of providing a 
holistic approach to curing violence.
55
  CeaseFire promotes sponsoring joint 
community-wide events with religious institutions, and encourages inviting faith-
based leaders to speak out at peace rallies.
56
  More importantly, the gang members 
that CeaseFire works with commonly need additional sources of support to help 
them make positive changes, and God is an integral part to their change.
57
  To those 
clients who speak of the need for a higher power in their lives, outreach workers 
encourage them to seek out the guidance of faith-based leaders.
58
  By incorporating 
faith-based leaders into the process of curing violence, the model further unites the 
community to tackle the problem of gang violence, thereby creating a more 
sustainable violence prevention initiative.
59
   
 The final aspect of the model entails utilizing the criminal justice system.  
Despite the fact that the criminal justice system’s participation is crucial to creating 
a holistic violence prevention approach, this component is, arguably, the source of 
the most tension.
60
  CeaseFire staff must balance the needs of their clients against 
the partnership with the police and local prosecutors.  Because CeaseFire is not anti-
gang, it does not actively try to dissuade clients from partaking in gang activities, 
even activities that may be illegal, such as using drugs.  Staff instead try to exert a 
positive and non-judgmental influence on clients, in the hope that the gang members 
themselves will realize that they must make smarter choices.
61
  However, this stance 
puts the model at odds with the aims of police and prosecutors, who are meant to 
uphold the law, and who look to the community to aid them in this objective.  Critics 
of the model argue that, by being aware of the illegal activities that gang members 
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are involved in, they are merely adding to the problem of crime and violence.  
Further, violence interrupters and outreach workers are also aware of possible ‘hits’ 
on other gang members.
62
  By withholding this knowledge, CeaseFire workers are 
putting people’s lives in jeopardy, with the possibility that these targeted individuals 
can get severely injured or killed.   
 What critics fail to see, however, is that CeaseFire workers have access to 
this information because they are trusted by the gangs.
63
  Gangs understand that 
CeaseFire is not trying to break up gang structure, and that the workers are meant as 
a support to help end the violence on the streets.
64
  To divulge the information that is 
shared to CeaseFire staff is to betray the trust that these gangsters have given them.  
Also, without this information, staff would not know of potential incidents that 
could result in violence, or who could be targeted in a retaliation shooting.  It is also 
important to note that staff do not passively sit by and ignore the information that is 
given to them.  They are constantly working to have youth make healthy, positive 
choices.  Another problematic aspect of working with the police is the need to 
protect the confidentiality of gang members who are clients.  Though CeaseFire 
does not have to voluntarily divulge information to the police, the prosecution still 
has the power to subpoena them for trials and the police can obtain records using 
proper warrants.
65
  No easy answer is given regarding how to protect the interests of 
their clients and simultaneously uphold justice, yet it is imperative that the trust that 
is fostered between CeaseFire and its clients must not be readily divulged.   
 Associating with the police may bring about such tension, yet it also helps 
create respect between the two entities.  By opening lines of communication with the 
police and viewing them as a partner in promoting peace, CeaseFire can help law 
enforcement understand how the model is meant to reduce the amount of crime and 
violence in the community, not enhance it.  CeaseFire can also be used by 
authorities in order to help gang members understand law enforcement’s role in 
supporting the community and reducing violence.  The police can additionally 
utilize its ties with CeaseFire to engage in potentially violent situations that they 
themselves may be unable to enter.  The police lack the resources and are bound by 




Teddi Dineley Johnson 8. 
64














bureaucratic tape that can prevent them from penetrating gang culture.
66
  Their 
perception within gangs also prevents them from obtaining knowledge about 
shootings.  Because violence interrupters and outreach workers are former ex-gang 
members, they have no such limitations on entering gang life and ultimately 
preventing volatile situations.  CeaseFire benefits from partnering with the police 
because it adds legitimacy to the organisation within the community.  Community 
members who worry that the organisation is no more than a gang-led association 
will be reassured if they see that the police endorse CeaseFire.  CeaseFire can also 
take advantage of any ties that it makes with law enforcement by inviting 
prosecutors and officers to come and speak to gang members at community events.  
By placing the two traditionally hostile parties into a neutral setting, gangsters can 
better understand the role that the criminal justice system has in stopping violence 
and how this role does not necessarily entail disbanding gangs.   
CeaseFire further demonstrates its commitment to utilizing different tactics 
towards violence in the manner that they gather data and monitor gang violence.  
One of its central tenets is to approach the violence epidemic scientifically, and to 
obtain data on where the most amount of violence occurs and who perpetrates such 
violence.
67
  As such, the model is evidence-based, and shows trends regarding the 
spread of violence.   By treating violence in a scientific manner, data and evidence 
can be accumulated and compared throughout neighbourhoods where the program is 
implemented and between different reporting periods.
68
  Traditional violence 
prevention programs do not utilize data in a similar manner and rather emerge due to 
public outcry against gang violence.  Such an emotional response also leads to 
hurried tactics, where the immediate desire is to satisfy the community’s need for 
justice.  Once the immediate emotional response subsides, the need for a sustainable 
prevention initiative also dwindles, until the next violent outbreak occurs.  By 
documenting and observing violent incidents, CeaseFire accumulates information 
that can be used to ensure that the model adapts to evolving trends and patterns, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of having a sustainable violence prevention model.           
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2B: Hiring the Ideal Interrupter to Access Gang Culture 
The five pillars of CeaseFire all play a vital part in the strategy to cure 
violence, yet enough cannot be said about the use of interrupters as part of the model 
and how it distinguishes CeaseFire from other initiatives.  Interrupters serve as the 
vital link between the community and gangs.
69
  Because of their status in society, 
gangs were often viewed as impenetrable.  To understand why gangs are so difficult 
to work with, one must examine why young men join gangs in the first place. The 
topic has long been a source of debate amongst criminologists.   One common point 
that is consistently raised is that such youth lack any positive role models to guide 
them through adolescence and young adulthood.
70
  This time of life is pivotal 
because it signals the change from boyhood to manhood.  Scholars such as Pinnock 
argue that young men need a symbolic rite of passage to show that they have 
successfully transitioned into this next chapter of their life.
71
  Strong male figures 
would often serve as the guides on this journey, explaining to the younger boys their 
responsibilities and roles when becoming men within their community.   In the 
African bush, for example, male members of various tribes would take the male 
youth into the wild for weeks and, while there, teach them the rites of their people.  
What occurred in the bush was kept secret from the rest of the tribe, but when the 
young men came back, they were deemed ready to be accepted as men.
72
   
In contrast, gang members often come from broken homes, where no father 
figure or strong male authority is present.  As a result, they rely on their peers to 
form rites of passage and rituals.
73
  However, because these peers have no 
knowledge or experience themselves, the rites are moulded around misguided 
perceptions of what it is to be a man.
74
  Those who have not gone through the 
initiation that gang members undergo can have no say as to what is considered as 
acceptable adult male behaviour.
75
  In order to gain the respect of gang members, 
one must have endured the same rituals and rites of passage.  Therefore, in order for 
CeaseFire to be successful, it relies on reformed gang members who have earned the 
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respect of gang members, and whose advice will be heeded.  Interrupters must be 
able to command this respect in the gangs; otherwise, they cannot persuade gang 
members to make healthy life choices and to ultimately avoid violence.  Workers 
will also be unable to have access to sensitive information, as well, such as when a 
potential violent conflict will occur, and who has a hit on whom.  The only way to 
gain such respect, then, is to have endured the same rites of passage and experiences 
that the current gang members have undergone.   
Thus, the program tends to hire former gang members themselves for the 
interrupter and outreach worker positions.  The interrupters must promise that they 
are no longer involved in any sort of gang activity, but they must have the 
knowledge and awareness of gang life.  In addition, not just any former gang 
member will suffice; the former gangster must have a respected reputation on the 
streets.
76
  In order to discern who has earned the respect of the gangs, gang members 
themselves have input on who will become an interrupter.  Gang members are not 
the sole decider as to who becomes an interrupter, however.  The model advocates 
the use of a panel to discern appropriate candidates for the violence interrupter 
position, as well.  The panel is comprised of CeaseFire staff, members of other 
community organisations, faith-based leaders, and a police representative.
77
  The 
panel asks questions relating to how comfortable candidates will be with engaging 
gang members and with mediating conflicts.  Ultimately, with the input of the gangs 
on the street, the panel has to determine how street-savvy the candidate is.   
 Once selected, the violence interrupters serve as crucial figures towards 
helping gang members reshape their ways of thinking.  Because the vast majority of 
interrupters have been gang members themselves at one time, they understand the 
rituals and the way of life that young gangsters embrace.  The interrupters have 
earned the respect of gang members and are thus more likely able to persuade 
gangsters to change their life around.
78
  They can fill the void that is left by a lack of 
a supportive male figure.  CeaseFire distinguishes itself from other violence 
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prevention programs because it recognizes this huge need for positive male role 
models within the gang community and actively fills it with interrupters.   
It is important to note that the model recognizes that an interrupter's street 
credibility must be balanced against the need for respect in the community.  Though 
the program emphasizes the use of reformed gangsters, there can be no conclusive 
way to discern whether a person is truly reformed or not.  Therefore, the model 
relies on what is said on the streets regarding the candidate’s reputation.
79
  If there 
are any hints that an interrupter is still involved in gang life, the program itself can 
be jeopardized.  CeaseFire again demonstrates that any successful violence 
prevention model must rely on the input of the community, both by gang members 
and non-gang members.
80
  Only with the community's involvement can the issue of 
violence be treated holistically and eventually be eradicated.    
The greatest strength of the program is also one of its greatest weaknesses.  
Though interrupters are reformed, because they are constantly immersed in gang 
culture and interact with people who are involved in criminal behaviour, the danger 
to fall back into old habits is great.  Further, the gang culture they deal with is often 
times the very gang culture they grew up in themselves, as interrupters are usually 
from the same community that they serve.   They regularly come across old friends 
who shared the same violent past and who have chosen to continue to live a life of 
violence.   In addition, the constant pressure of having to mediate conflict and serve 
as a positive model for others can be overwhelming, making the possibility of 
returning to one's old lifestyle all the more attractive.    Yet relapsing affects 
CeaseFire's reputation, as well.  The constant question that arises is whether a 
program can truly be effective if it is run by gang members who are in danger of 
falling back into their old habits.  The simple answer is yes.  Though there is a 
danger that some interrupters may relapse, the overall positive effect they have on a 
previously unreachable part of the community vastly outweighs any potential risks.  
Those who do go back to their former lifestyle – or never actually leave it – can be 
replaced by other successfully reformed gang members.  Becoming an interrupter 
also gives hope to gang members who struggle to change their own lives.  Gang 
members need the inspiration from their male role models, these reformed gangsters 
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who once were considered street-corner thugs and who have now managed to 
change their lives and serve their community.
81
  Not only do they give back to their 
community, but they are paid for the work they do and after rejecting gang-life, they 
become part of a new group – a group that works to end violence and better the 
community. 
2C: The Universal Nature of the Beast 
 In order to critically evaluate CeaseFire, we need to understand the nature of 
the problem that it is trying to address.  Violence, and specifically gang violence, is 
a universal issue that affects entire communities.  The violent acts that gangs partake 
in leave communities feeling helpless and intimidated.  Further, the lives that are 
lost as a result of this violence are grieved by the community, as well.  Gang 
violence shares similar traits throughout the world, no matter how developed the 
country or how diverse the cultures.
82
  Typically, gangs form in impoverished areas 
and are developed from more marginalized classes
83
.  Gangs commonly partake in 
illegal activities, such as selling drugs and firearms, and they often are very 
territorial.  Turf wars are common, where one gang attempts to establish dominance 
over another by taking over their turf.  These traits are prevalent in both the gang 
cultures within Chicago and Cape Town.
84
  A closer look at the gang cultures in 
both cities reveals just how common the problem is.   
 Chicago has long been overrun by gangs, with an estimated 60 gangs in 
existence.  These gangs are split into over 600 factions.  Historically, Chicago gangs 
were derived from two main opposing gangs, the Folks and the Peoples, and were 
formed out of a necessity to protect neighbourhoods from outsiders.
85
  Today, 
Chicago police believe that anywhere from 68,000 to 150,000 Chicagoans belong to 
a gang, making Chicago the city with the most amount of gang members in the 
nation.
86
  The sheer numbers of these gangs have led to fights over territory and 
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gang warfare, which have contributed significantly to the city's astronomical 
homicide rate.  For example, some estimate that roughly 80 per cent of homicides in 
2012 were due to gang violence.
87
  The desire of each gang to establish control and 
assert their power manifests itself block by block, where one city block is dominated 
by one gang and the very next block is dominated by another rival gang.  
Community members are restricted from moving between blocks lest they get 
caught in the crossfire.
88
  This fear pervades throughout the city as gangs are seen as 
predators and thugs.  Similarly, the gangs within Hanover Park are viewed as 
terrorizing the community itself.  The gangs are divided into two main rival groups 
that are represented by the American and British flags, respectively, and each group 
has several factions.
89
   The battle over turf has contributed to the significant amount 
of homicides and shootings within the area, as well.  Similar to Chicago, the gang 
members in Hanover Park come from a historically marginalized section of society, 
as most gang members are coloured.   
 Chicago lawmakers have long struggled with introducing an effective 
violence prevention model.  From these past attempts, it is clear that any model must 
include gang members themselves.  Gang life is pervasive throughout the city, and 
roughly 45 per cent of individuals who are arrested report that they are or have been 
in a gang.
90
  Without incorporating gangs into the solution to eradicate violence, no 
long-lasting initiative can prevail.  The model that CeaseFire adopts makes it the 
ideal candidate for spearheading a campaign against gang violence.  CeaseFire 
focuses on providing support services to high-risk gang members, and brings them 
together with the rest of the community to cure the disease of violence.  The 
program recognizes that gang members cannot be vilified as the source of crime.  
Rather, the focus is on violence as the evil which must be eradicated by utilizing the 
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efforts of the entire community.
91
  As shown below, the employment of CeaseFire in 
Chicago has proven to be successful.   
2D: Finding Success by Engaging with 'High-Risk' Youth 
Analysing the success rates for a violence prevention program such as 
CeaseFire can be complicated, since the program's effectiveness must be isolated 
against other possible factors that cause a decline.  Other indicators of declines in 
violence include citywide efforts to reduce violence, stricter law enforcement in 
high-crime areas, and other violence prevention initiatives that are launched in the 
same neighbourhood.  In addition, simply looking at the reductions in gang-related 
shootings will not give an adequate indication of how successful the program is.
92
  
On a more individual level, it is necessary to gauge the impact that the program has 
on the clients.  When assessing such success, one must ask if the clients are able to 
make better life choices as a result of the support from CeaseFire.  Success can also 
be measured by how well an outreach worker can link up a client to needed services, 
such as job readiness programs and anger management classes.
93
  Another key 
indicator of success is the impact that CeaseFire has on its own staff, as many of 
these employees were former gang members and ex-convicts themselves.   Did the 
program help former gang members maintain their commitment to stay away from 
their former lifestyle?  What were the motivations for former gang-members to work 
for CeaseFire?  Was it simply the promise of paid employment?  Finally, the 
perception of CeaseFire within the community is another key point that must be 
examined to determine the model's success.  Did the community feel that the 
program was a positive influence?  Was CeaseFire able to work with other 
community organisations in order to reduce violence?  All these factors are relevant 
to any analysis of whether the program was successful.   Studies have been done of 
the program's impact, and the results demonstrate that CeaseFire is a successful 
model in multiple aspects.     


















Overall, there has been a 41 per cent to 73 per cent drop in shootings and 
killings in areas where the program has been implemented.
94
  While this drop can 
also be prescribed to other factors in addition to CeaseFire's presence, such as 
increased police presence and other violence prevention programs in the area, 
studies point to the fact that there was a 16 per cent to 35 per cent drop in shootings 
directly attributed to CeaseFire’s initiatives.
95
  Another statistic that can be used to 
measure the program's success is the reduction of killings that are considered 
retaliatory.  Retaliatory murders often occur after one member of a gang kills or 
shoots another member or one his friends or family members.  Because retaliations 
can be anticipated after a shooting, violence interrupters are tasked with mediating 
the tension that arises and preventing retaliations from occurring.  In the sites that 




In 2007, a study was conducted of the impact that the Chicago CeaseFire 
program had in the neighbourhoods that implemented the model.  Specifically, 
seven different neighbourhoods were evaluated to see if both actual and attempted 
shootings decreased in those areas as compared to neighbouring sites.  Five out of 
seven of those neighbourhoods demonstrated a decrease in shootings as a result of 
CeaseFire interventions, with declines ranging anywhere from 16 to 28 per cent, 
depending on the location.
97
  The areas where CeaseFire was located also grew 
safer, with less shootings and homicides reported.  Further, when examining the 
statistics for gang-related homicides and shootings, several neighbourhoods where 
the program was implemented experienced a drop in gang deaths that could be 
attributable to CeaseFire.  The figure is all the more impressive because many 
CeaseFire sites experienced lay-offs and budget restrictions due to lack of 
government funding.
98
  In fact, a few sites had to close the program altogether due to 
funding shortages.    
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In terms of working with other community organisations, CeaseFire 
recognized the importance of engaging partners to work together to reduce violence.  
Thus, they sought local community leaders and police officers to serve on hiring 
panels so that different segments of the community could have input on who was to 
be hired by the program.  Further, many local businesses hung up CeaseFire's 
posters and flyers in their storefronts to show solidarity with the model's mission.  
When questioned about the practice of hiring reformed gang members, many 
community members expressed support, saying that it gave these men an 
opportunity to make amends with the community.
99
  The CeaseFire outreach 
workers and interrupters also agreed.  They believed that CeaseFire was a way to 
help them atone for the past wrongs they had committed.  Particularly, many of 
these reformed individuals had spent their youth gangbanging within the community 
that they worked in.  By trying to influence young gangsters to take a different path, 
CeaseFire staff felt they had a greater purpose and believed that their decision to 
become reformed had been validated.
100
  Though having a steady income was an 
incentive to join the CeaseFire team, many CeaseFire workers welcomed the chance 
to be employed at all.  Often, their criminal backgrounds prevented them from 
obtaining any suitable, stable employment.  What work they did find usually was in 
the form of menial work, such as kitchen staff or janitorial duties.  CeaseFire offered 
more than just a pay check; it was a chance at making a difference for youth who 
were embarking on similar paths of life.
101
  These gang members also felt the impact 
of having a caseworker who served as a support.  Youth who were identified as 
clients were mostly high-risk, and they relied heavily on the aid of CeaseFire 
workers to navigate the streets and make smart decisions.  Most importantly, these 
youth had a guide who would not judge them and understood the realities that they 
faced on an everyday basis. 
On many different levels, CeaseFire's approach has proven to be necessary to 
any holistic violence prevention strategy.  Not only do the number of shootings and 
killings decline, but the impact on both gang members and the rest of the community 
is significant, as well.  Gang members become more integrated into the community 
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and have the chance to change their lives, and community residents no longer view 
gangsters as thugs.  Because of the similarities with Cape Town's gang problem, 
implementing the program in an area such as Hanover Park can yield comparable 
results.  However, in order to see just how Chicago's program proved to be 
successful, it is necessary to look deeper into how the model is implemented in 
Chicago. 
2E: Chicago and Hanover Park Hiring Practices 
CeaseFire attributes its success at least in part to the outreach staff and 
interrupters who work with youth on a day-to-day basis.  These youth were once an 
impenetrable section of the Chicago population, who only associated with 
individuals who underwent similar rites of passage and who had first-hand 
knowledge of the world within which they lived.  Outreach staff served as the bridge 
between the community and the gang world, and it was therefore crucial to hire the 
right person to serve as this link.  Thus, a vast majority of outreach workers in 
Chicago had been gang members themselves, and had also been in jail at some point 
in their lives.
102
  Also, most outreach workers were from the neighbourhood that 
they worked in.  They were therefore familiar with the clients that were served 
through the local site.  In one survey, 60 per cent of workers reported that they knew 
some of their clients before they had started to work at CeaseFire and the majority of 
clients in another survey reported that the outreach workers were very connected to 
the streets
103
.  Another feature of outreach workers was the fact that most of them 
were male.  The preference to hiring men was due to the fact that mostly young men 
belonged to gangs and they needed a positive male figure to help provide them 
support and guidance.   
Though the model emphasizes the hiring of former gang members and street-
savvy individuals, it also gives local sites more freedom in how they carry out their 
hiring process.  The model advocates the use of certain safeguards to prevent hiring 
the wrong candidate, and these safeguards are meant to be a guide for local sites.  
The safeguards were initially established because the program takes a lot of risk in 
hiring former gang-members and ex-offenders.  The struggles for former gang 
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members to maintain a clean life, away from gang culture and drugs, are well-
documented.  In fact, part of the process of maintaining a new lifestyle involves 
encountering relapses along the way.  These relapses while being employed at 
CeaseFire can have a serious impact on the image of the model.  Media reports of 
CeaseFire staff who have been caught on the wrong side of the law can make it 
appear as if the model is run by gangsters, with no thought of actually ending 
violence.
104
  Further, politicians who oppose government funding of the model can 
point to such reports to claim that the program does not, in fact, work.  Because 
CeaseFire depends largely on government funding, any negative press can cause the 
program to shut down.
105
   
 CeaseFire therefore takes precautions to ensure that any potential new 
outreach workers and interrupters have truly reformed and stay away from doing 
drugs and other illegal activities.  These precautions vary from the headquarters at 
the University of Illinois to the local branches and from local organisation to local 
organisation.  As the headquarters is responsible for developing and implementing 
CeaseFire throughout the world, and thus gets funding from more numerous sources, 
it employs stricter methods of screening potential employees.  For example, the head 
office at CPVP conducts background checks on all potential candidates.
106
  Though 
they do hire ex-convicts, any candidate who has been convicted of a crime against a 
woman or child is ineligible to be hired, the concern being that such a candidate 
would not work well with staff or clients.  In addition, any candidate who had a 
current pending charge was also automatically disqualified from working in the 
program.  In contrast to CPVP's policy, some local branches have stricter guidelines 
for hiring ex-convicts due to contracts with other government branches, such as the 
Department of Children and Family Services.
107
  Obtaining a background check also 
could take several weeks, during which time the position is often left open.  
Needless to say, background checks are viewed by many sites as a bureaucratic 
hindrance which stalls the process of getting workers out on the streets to deal with 
violent situations.   
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  Another safeguard that has been implemented in different ways by various 
CeaseFire sites is the use of drug screens.  Because of the fear of negative publicity, 
CeaseFire advocates screening staff for drugs.  The use of drug screens is 
controversial, as various staff members believed that certain drugs, such as 
marijuana, should not bar a person from working on the streets.
108
  Further, 
CeaseFire's policy of solely focusing on testing outreach workers and interrupters 
seemed discriminatory and unfair to employees.  Thus, in regards to implementation 
of drug screens in Chicago, again, CPVP and local branches have varying policies.  
CPVP tested every outreach worker and interrupter on its payroll.
109
  However, drug 
tests on a large scale are costly, especially when testing employees repeatedly 
throughout their term of employment.  Some local organisations staff 200-300 
employees, and therefore drug testing on a regular basis is nearly impossible, as a 
significant portion of the budget would have to be reserved for such screens.  
Therefore, CPVP allows for drug screens to be done at the local site's discretion.
110
  
Some sites chose to test every candidate while others relied on a candidate's self-
report that they were drug-free.       
CeaseFire headquarters imposes a minimum education requirement for its 
employees as well.  Outreach workers and interrupters are required to have obtained 
a high school diploma or its equivalent.  This is to ensure that workers are able to 
handle the large amounts of paperwork that is associated with the job.
111
  Because 
the model relies on data and evidence to demonstrate that interventions with gang 
members results in less amounts of violence, interrupters and outreach workers are 
the driving force in producing that data.  They write detailed summaries of their 
interactions with clients and conflicts, and outreach workers helps their clients write 
treatment plans.  In addition, staffs are also meant to encourage their clients to 
complete their GED or obtain their high school diploma.   In this context, it is more 
appropriate for staff to have also obtained their high school degree.  However, the 
minimum education requirement can be waived in certain circumstances.
112
  If a 
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client is deemed to be particularly street-savvy, or presents vital skills for the 
position, his education background can be waived. 
 Similar to the program in Chicago, CeaseFire Hanover Park sought to find 
violence interrupters and outreach workers who were familiar with the gangs and the 
community.  Unlike Chicago, however, no panels were used to hire the interrupters.  
Instead, the executive director and a representative from VPUU made the final 
decision to hire.
113
  They heavily emphasized the importance of input from the at-
risk youth they wished to serve.  Therefore, after a potential new hire was 
interviewed, the FCRC staff went around the community to discern the street 
reputation of the candidate.
114
  If the perception was that the candidate garnered 
respect within the community and seemed to be genuinely reformed, then he was 
likely hired.  However, if there was any belief that the person did not have respect, 
then he was not hired.   
Candidates did not go through drug screens or extensive background checks.  
Further, while employees were expected to have a basic sense of writing, no 
minimum education requirement was set.  Rather, the crucial factor in determining 
whether to hire someone was their street-savvy.  Reputation within the community 
was extremely vital in order to be the ideal candidate.  Another important feature 
that distinguishes the program from CeaseFire Chicago was the prevalence of 
workers who also had belonged to the Numbers gang while in prison.  In contrast, 
Chicago gang members who went to jail continued to belong to the same street gang 
that they were a part of prior to jail. 
 When interviewing potential candidates as violence interrupters, the 
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Die Gange, Jungle 
 
Each candidate was further colour-coded to determine how credible they were and in 
what areas.  For instance, a candidate was colour-coded green if they were credible 
in all neighbourhoods and amongst all groups and dark orange if they were credible 
in their own neighbourhood and had no credibility amongst any group.  In addition, 
when referring to a candidate, the prison gang that the person had been previously a 
part of was also referred to within the same column.   
When consulting at-risk youth, CeaseFire staff was also encouraged to try 
and build trusting relationships with the youth, by asserting that the program was 
anti-shooting and not anti-gang.  Also, after explaining the CeaseFire model, 
workers were instructed to ask high-risk youth if they knew of anyone else who 
would be suitable violence interrupters or outreach workers.
116
  Of the six 
interrupters who were initially identified as violence interrupters, three of them had 
belonged to the Americans gang and two of them had been members of the 26s 
when they were in prison.  The one woman on the team had been a counsellor at a 
local high school.
117
   
In its hiring practices, CeaseFire Hanover Park kept in line with CeaseFire 
Chicago's tenets, and employed street-savvy individuals who had previously been 
involved with gangs.  Both communities viewed former gang members as the best 
hope for linking the community with gangs in an effort to cure violence, and both 
program's hiring practices underlie this hope, albeit with safeguards in place.  Yet 
the model allows enough flexibility for each site to implement the strategy as they 
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see fit.  Thus, CeaseFire Hanover Park was able to decide how best to hire 
appropriate staff.   
2F: Client Make-Up 
 Another factor that has led to CeaseFire's success in Chicago is choosing the 
right client base.  Because CeaseFire distinguishes itself from other models by 
addressing the needs of gang members, it is crucial to find the right gang members 
who are extremely high-risk and who are also receptive to getting help.  In Chicago, 
outreach workers were given much leeway in selecting potential clients for their 
own caseload.  Most of these clients were selected off the street, where outreach 
workers spent most of their time.
118
  Any likely candidates were assessed in informal 
interviews on the street.  Outreach workers primarily looked for high-risk clients, 
and they evaluated gang members as high-risk based on several criteria.  These 
criteria included whether a person was part of a gang, whether the person had been 
arrested, the age of the individual, and whether the person had been the victim of a 
shooting.
119
  A survey conducted in 2008 details how many clients met the selection 
criteria: 82 per cent of clients had been arrested, and 45 per cent reported having 
been arrested five times or more.  56 per cent had spent "more than a day or two" in 
jail at least once and more than 90 per cent were involved in gangs.
120
 A majority of 
the interviewed clients in Chicago were African American, with the second highest 
race surveyed being Hispanic.  In comparison, candidates in Hanover Park were all 
coloured.  Both sets of clients represented marginalized sections of society.  
Outreach workers would also ask others on the street about the reputation of 
potential clients to decide whether or not a gang member would make a good 
candidate.     
Once outreach workers had obtained an adequate caseload of about 15 
clients, they set about assisting their clients with obtaining needed services.  The 
most common problem that clients reported having was obtaining a job.
121
  In fact, 
most of the other problems were related in some manner to becoming a more 
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attractive candidate for employment.  For example, many clients also reported 
needing adequate mental health services and anger management courses so that they 
could better function with others.  In addition, clients sought to improve their 
education, by wanting help to enrol in a GED program or specialized trade 
courses.
122
     
In Chicago, the support system provided by CeaseFire staff was extremely 
important to clients.  For many gang members, their outreach worker was a key role 
in their lives.  In one survey, clients reported that, after their parents, their outreach 
worker was the most important person in their life.
123
  Other forms of support, in the 
form of siblings, teachers, spouses, and other family members, were ranked below 
their outreach worker.  Clients reported that they often relied on their worker during 
crucial moments in their lives, such as when they were thinking of getting involved 
in illegal activities or taking drugs.
124
   Also, outreach workers did more than just 
link clients up to services.  Often-times, workers served as informal counsellors and 
advisers to their clients, providing them support when no one else would.  Clients 
were able to talk to their outreach worker because they shared similar experiences 
and had an understanding of gang culture and gang life.
125
  Though it is too early to 
evaluate the impact that outreach workers have in Hanover Park, it is likely that, 
given the similar situations that  gang members grew up in, they also feel the 
positive impact that having an outreach worker provides them.     
2G: Misconception of Funding and Sustainability Chicago 
 A popular misconception about the CeaseFire model is that it cannot be 
transplanted to a country such as South Africa because its roots are based in a first-
world country.  Funding opportunities in first-world countries are much more 
numerous and diverse than in other parts of the world.
126
  The model would 
therefore not be able to work as effectively in South Africa, because the available 
resources would be limited, as would sources of funding.  However, CeaseFire 
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Chicago has been engaged in a struggle to obtain adequate funding since its 
inception.  Despite its hardships, the program has been able to prove that it works to 
reduce violence.  Its success demonstrates that the model can be implemented in 
areas where funding may be limited.  Yet as the following comparison will show, 
CeaseFire Hanover Park has a more adequate funding base than CeaseFire Chicago.   
 The funding for CeaseFire Chicago comes from a variety of different 
sources, such as foundation grants, state funding, and private donations.
127
  One 
must consider the fact, however, that funding is divided up between CeaseFire 
headquarters at CPVP, which oversees all the sites around the world, and the local 
sites within the city.  Each derives its funding from different places due to the 
differing needs at the global, national, and local levels of CeaseFire.  For example, 
CPVP consists of four offices.  Each of these offices is involved in a different aspect 
of CeaseFire, ranging from development, implementation, training, and public 
education, and is therefore funded differently.  To give an idea of how big the 
national and international budget can be, one can examine the 2007 CPVP budget.  
CPVP's management office received $1,913,635 to support all site projects that ran 
locally, nationally, and internationally.  The evaluation office received $312,453 for 
staff and survey support. The community development office received $636,709 for 
technical assistance in Illinois, $725,183 for outreach staff work in Illinois not 
managed by contracts with sites, and for violence interrupters, community support, 
client youth activities, and $51,600 for public education materials. The total CPVP 
budget for 2007 was $3,639,580.
128   
Though the numbers are substantial, one must 
bear in mind that this money was dispersed to both the headquarters and throughout 
the world to support local sites.  In total, there are 50 sites in 15 cities in 8 different 
countries.  In light of these numbers, the budget becomes less substantial.     
 In contrast, at the local level, community organisations received a budget of 
approximately $250,000 per year.129  The money went towards paying the salaries 
of the local CeaseFire outreach staff.  Though considered to be part of the CeaseFire 
team, violence interrupters were not paid by their local organisations.  Rather, they 
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were paid through CPVP's main budget, and their funding took the form of a federal 
grant.
130
  In addition to paying outreach staff, community organisations also 
received some funding to support local community events and outings.
131
  Almost 
all of the local sites were funded by the State of Illinois, through its Department of 
Corrections.  Some organisations were also able to secure additional local funding, 
but this was atypical.
132
   
Though overall, CeaseFire obtained funding from a variety of sources, it was 
heavily reliant on government funding.
133
  For example, in 2006, state and federal 
sources gave $7.5 million to the entire CeaseFire program.  In contrast, local 
foundations gave $1.7 million and corporations only contributed roughly 
$130,000.
134
  Being funded by the government was extremely problematical, 
however, especially because government budgets were renewed on a yearly basis.  
Thus, CeaseFire could be extremely well-funded one year and have virtually no 
funding the next.  This one year window was also especially burdensome when 
trying to implement a program in a new area.
135
  For example, a newly developed 
site would need to hire appropriate staff and outreach workers.  This could take 
anywhere from several weeks to several months, depending on the availability of 
suitable candidates.  Once hiring occurred, these employees would have to be 
trained by headquarters, which again took several months.  In addition, outreach 
workers needed to build up a caseload, and both outreach workers and violence 
interrupters needed to gain the trust of both gang members and the community.
136
  
This type of trust only occurs with time.  However, funders would expect evidence 
that gang violence was in fact being reduced by the end of the one year period.  In 
order to even track the numbers of shootings, a monitoring and evaluation plan had 
to be developed.  While developing such a plan, the local organisation needed to 
look for alternative sources of funding, as well.
137
  Overall, having to worry about 
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funding for the following year was a major distraction to actually realizing 
CeaseFire’s mission.   
Another source of concern was the violence interrupter’s contracts.  The 
violence interrupters were only meant to work 900 hours before their contract was 
renewed.  Yet many interrupters went over their allocated hours and were forced to 
stop working until the next contract. 
138
 In addition, because funding had to be 
renewed every year, interrupters would have to work with the knowledge that their 
contracts might not get renewed the following term.  Moreover, violence interrupters 
could not rely on the aide of local sites, because funding and contracts were handled 
by CPVP.
139
  This level of uncertainty again distracted interrupters from focusing on 
mediating potentially violent conflicts, and the lack of funding also proved to be 
detrimental to the clients, as they had no one to turn to should an interrupter get laid 
off.   
The other source of concern regarding funding was the fact that most of the 
money came solely from the State of Illinois.  The model was therefore at the mercy 
of local politics.
140
  In order for one political party to have certain programs funded, 
they would threaten to deny funding for CeaseFire within the districts of opposing 
political parties.
141
  If, in fact, one political party’s demands were not met, then 
funding for CeaseFire would be cut.  This is what happened in 2007.  The governor 
of the state and the legislature, both belonging to different parties, could not agree 
upon the budget for the following year.  Infuriated with the legislature for not 
agreeing to his spending proposals, the governor used his power to cut various items 
out of the state budget, including funding for CeaseFire.
142
   
 Due to the politics involved in funding CeaseFire, much of the program’s 
manpower in Chicago is devoted to lobbying for funding for the following year.  
Employees must call their local representatives, encourage community members to 
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contact their own representatives, and rally outside government offices.
143
  This 
manpower would best be used to continue the fight to reduce violence, however, 
without needed funding, CeaseFire would not exist.  Another issue that CeaseFire 
Chicago had to contend with was the fact that some officials expect favours in return 
for their support.  For example, a representative may wish to have a CeaseFire 
program established in another part of their district, despite the fact that one may 
already exist.
144
  A common request is that the representative asks CeaseFire staff to 
campaign for the representative during the next election.  This poses a dilemma as 
CeaseFire is not affiliated with any party or elected official.  On the one hand, 
CeaseFire needs political clout to stay on the budget; on the other, politics interferes 
with the ultimate aims of the program.  Thus, contrary to the belief that CeaseFire 
Chicago has many more funding opportunities and resources available to it, the 
program regularly is threatened with being closed down. 
2H: Sustained Funding for CeaseFire Hanover Park 
Though one would expect that CeaseFire Hanover Park would be more 
difficult to implement because the area is not as wealthy as its Chicago counterpart, 
CeaseFire Hanover Park does not have the same budgetary constraints that plague 
Chicago's CeaseFire program.  The City of Cape Town, through the department of 
Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading – or VPUU for short – has partnered 
with the Western Cape Government's Provincial Department of Community Safety 
to run a pilot program within Cape Town for several years.  The government 
allocated R9 million over a period of 3 years to develop and implement the 
CeaseFire program.
145
  This amount is all the more significant because it is allocated 
solely for the use of one local site, and does not have to be spread throughout the 
country, unlike with CPVP's budget.   
Because the model hinged on a local community organisation to spearhead 
the program, a public announcement was made to all Hanover Park organisations to 
submit a tender to the city if they were interested in hosting CeaseFire.  The winning 
bid was awarded to First Community Resource centre.  The contract started in 


















August 2012, and First Community Resource centre was tasked with developing and 
implementing the model.
146
  Cape Town's government has shown even more 
enthusiasm for the program than Chicago, as it is willing to pour in additional 
money for supplemental CeaseFire initiatives.  For instance, prior to implementation 
of the program, the Provincial Department of Community Safety invested R250, 000 
into the initial training of 26 community members in the CeaseFire model.
147
   
Like CeaseFire Chicago, CeaseFire Hanover Park must cater to the 
government as the organisation is completely reliant on government funding.  Thus, 
VPUU works closely with FCRC to ensure that the funding for CeaseFire is 
appropriately managed.  FCRC submits an estimated budget every quarter to detail 
the expenses that they are expected to incur and a monthly report explaining the 
activities for that period.
148
 
Though the government's influx of money to CeaseFire is substantial, it must 
be noted that the government money itself is derived from various sources.  VPUU 
was established through the partnership between the City of Cape Town, along with 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
German Development Bank – Ktw.
149
  The German infusion of capital has been a 
huge support to running VPUU and a breakdown of their assistance can be seen 
below (where the amount in rands represents the amount given by the German 




Phase Amount in Rands Status Intervention Area 
Phase 1 R75 million complete Khayelitsha 
Phase 2 R30 million complete Khayelitsha 
                                                          
146
  City of Cape Town, Report to Executive Mayor. 5. 
147
  City of Cape Town, Report to Executive Mayor. 4. 
148
First Community Resource Centre. Hanover Park CeaseFire Monthly Report. (Cape Town: First 
Community Resource Centre, 15 April 2013.) 3. 
149
City of Cape Town. Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading Project. (n.p. n.d.) 3. 
150












Phase 3 R50 million underway Khayelitsha/Cape 
Flats 
Phase 4 R50 million New allocation To be determined 
 
Phase 3 of the funding is meant to introduce the VPUU methodology to Hanover 
Park and Manenburg within the Cape Flats.  CeaseFire's funding falls under this 
phase as part of VPUU's work in the Cape Flats.  However, the German funding will 
not be indefinite and VPUU must look to other sources of funding once the German 
partnership is concluded after Phase 4 is completed.  The funding that CeaseFire 
Hanover Park has obtained disproves the notion that less-developed countries cannot 
match the funding that more advanced countries can provide.  On the contrary, 
through unique partnerships and local support, CeaseFire can thrive in different 
communities.  A more real concern is ensuring that funding, no matter how much or 
how little, be given on a constant basis, without any threat of disappearing from year 
to year.  By allocating the money over a 3 year period, Cape Town has shown their 





























Chapter 3: Gang Development in Chicago and Hanover Park 
3A: From Immigrants to Gangsters:  How Gangs Developed in Chicago 
CeaseFire as it operates in Chicago focuses on the most violent areas of the 
city.  Using data given to them by the police, CeaseFire determines which 
neighbourhoods have the highest rates of shootings and homicides.
151
  Not 
surprisingly, these sites are mostly located on the South and West side of Chicago, 
and are predominantly comprised of African Americans and Latinos.
152
  Most of 
these residents live below the poverty line, as well.
153
  The Chicago-land 
neighbourhoods that incorporated CeaseFire also shared similar historical 
backgrounds.  Many of the neighbourhoods had been comprised of largely 
immigrant families up until the 1950s and 60s.
154
  Working class Germans, Irish, 
and Italians called the South Side their home, and many still do.  However, due to 
economic conditions, starting in the 50s, more and more African Americans started 
moving into the city.  Land was still cheap on the south side; particularly the further 
away one was from Lake Michigan and from downtown Chicago.
155
  Also, more 
blue-collar work could be found on the South Side.   
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The South Side was home to the meat-packing industry, as well as the steel 
and retail industries.  However, as blacks started moving in, whites started moving 
out.  Coupled with this mass migration was the decline of the industries that once 
supported the local economy.
156
  As businesses relocated or went bankrupt, they 
closed huge plants and stores within the local communities.
157
  These buildings 
remain abandoned to this day, and create an air of neglect and disuse within the 
neighbourhoods.  In addition, these buildings are ideal spots for drug deals and 
involvement in other illegal activities.  Another common feature that the various 
neighbourhoods which CeaseFire operates in is the prevalence of large apartment 
buildings that are owned by absentee landlords.
158
  These buildings show signs of 
disrepair and neglect, as well.  However, because of their state, rent can be relatively 
cheap.  Thus, poorer residents keep such buildings profitable, as they are unable to 
afford any other type of housing.  The conditions of these neighbourhoods deter any 
potential investors from buying up property.
159
  Without such investors, jobs are 
scarce and limited to the local businesses, such as grocery stores and hair dressers. 
The amount of unemployment is extremely high, and consequently, a high rate of 
families also live below the poverty line.  Estimates of households who fall below 
the poverty line range anywhere from a quarter of the population to half, depending 
on the neighbourhood that is surveyed.
160
       
 In choosing the sites within Chicago, other factors were considered.  High 
crime was linked to high gang activity, and many of the neighbourhoods chosen had 
inadequate responses when trying to deal with the violence.  Where the need for a 
model such as CeaseFire was great, those neighbourhoods would get prioritized 
first.  However, politicians also tried to convince CeaseFire to establish the model in 
their own wards.
161
  Having the support had both up and down sides, as political 
support meant access to the network of potential allies that the program would not 
normally have.  Political support also came at a price sometimes, especially when 
politicians were eager to claim that the program endorsed their run for office around 
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  Political support was balanced against the other factors that went 
into deciding where to place the program. 
 In terms of placement in Cape Town, critics of implementing CeaseFire in 
Hanover Park point to the notable differences between Chicago's and Hanover Park's 
history.  Specifically, Chicago did not have laws which forced the removal of large 
segments of its population based on race.  The effects of such measures as the Group 
Areas Act and other Apartheid laws are still felt today in Cape Town.  However, 
Chicago's own history of battling segregation and racism has made it the most 
segregated city in the United States, where blacks and Latinos live in the most 
impoverished neighbourhoods of the city.  Though no official law decreed that these 
populations could only live in designated areas, the overall effects of racism can still 
be felt.  This history closely matches Cape Town's apartheid struggles.  A closer 
look into the development of Cape Town gangs illustrates the parallels between the 
two cities, as well as highlights some of the major differences.   
3B: From District Six to the Ganglands of Hanover Park 
 Gangs in Cape Town only began to develop when mass migrations to the 
urban areas throughout South Africa started to occur, between 1924 and 1946.  It 
was during this time that the country had suffered from a five-year drought and from 
the effects of the Great Depression, which resulted in a scarcity of jobs for the rural 
poor.
163
  Many farms had no work to offer, which drove people to seek employment 
elsewhere.  Believing that more opportunities would be found in urban areas, the 
rural poor flocked to cities such as Cape Town.  Because of this migration, areas 
such as District Six in Cape Town were transformed from a mostly European 
population to one that consisted of a coloured working class.
164
  The coloured class 
was able to find more opportunity in urban areas, as South Africa had experienced 
an economic boom.  More factories sprang up in these cities, and along with them 
rose the demand for cheap labour.  Factory work was not the only source of 
employment for the masses, since more people meant a greater need for goods and 
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services, such as groceries, clothing items, and other everyday living essentials.
165
  
Thus, people were able to find a wide variety of work, ranging from grocers to 
seamstresses to barbers.  A parallel here can be drawn with Chicago, as black 
workers arrived in droves into the city in order to take advantage of the job 
opportunities available.  An economic boom had created a need for blue-collar 
workers similar to the one experienced in Cape Town.      
 In both cities, the work paid extremely low wages, and resulted in these 
working classes residing in the poorer areas of their respective cities.  In Cape 
Town, areas such as District Six were overcrowded with residents, who shared 
cramped quarters.
166
  With the constant infusion of rural workers, District Six 
steadily became more and more overcrowded.  In addition, more and more areas 
within the city were designated 'whites only' areas, forcing more coloured families to 
move into the already overflowing District Six.
167
  One of the consequences of the 
overcrowding was the growing number of youth who came together and started 
hanging out on street corners and other public spaces.  These youth were poor and 
had nothing to do.
168
  They were nicknamed the 'skollies,' as they were considered 
outsiders to the area.
169
  In response to these bands of skollies, vigilante groups of 
youth formed to oust them from District Six.  These gangs were often comprised of 
the children of the more affluent District Six families and tended to distinguish 
themselves as more up-scale by dressing in fashionable clothes.  Originally, these 
vigilante groups would work with the police.
170
  Gradually, however, gangs such as 
The Globe became drawn to the profits and allure of various illegal businesses, such 
as racketeering and running shebeens.
171
  They harassed local shop-owners and 
made these shopkeepers pay 'protection fees.'  Over time, the Globe resembled the 
gangs which they had fought to keep out of District Six.  
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 The gangs of District Six did not resemble the gangs of Hanover Park today, 
and community members did not live with the fear that currently pervades the Cape 
Flats.  One of the primary reasons that community members were able to have a 
better handle on gangs was because a stronger sense of community existed in 
District Six.  District Six residents were able to create extensive support networks 
with family and friends.
172
  Those who worked pooled their income together to help 
the entire community, both employed and unemployed.  This income served to meet 
basic household needs.  Unemployed members found other ways to contribute, such 
as taking care of everyday household duties.
173  
In this manner, families of the urban 
poor became more than the nuclear parent-child household.  Extended families 
proved to be a key factor in surviving in District Six.   These families were able to 
take on duties that would have otherwise been costly to utilize.  For instance, due to 
a lack of adequate police protection, extended families were relied upon to keep the 
area safe and secure.
174  
Also, working parents could have their children be 
supervised by aunts, uncles, or grandparents.  Members of the family each had roles 
to play in order to support the extended family.
175
  Furthermore, the 'informal' 
economy that operated in District Six helped the otherwise unemployed make a 
somewhat sustainable living for themselves.    
 Against the backdrop of the daily lives of the coloured class in District Six, 
the Apartheid government began to pass laws that would forever change South 
Africa's social structures.  These laws deepened the divide between the races, as well 
as between the working and upper classes.  The Registration Act was one such 
example of a law that classified all South Africans into racial categories, and the 
Group Areas Act was also passed at this time.
176  
The Apartheid laws not only 
created a divide amongst the different races, they also tore up the social fabric that 
comprised the extended family networks.  In particular, the youth felt the effects of a 
lack of an extended support system.  They no longer had positive role models who 
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could guide them into making healthy decisions for themselves, and eventually 
sought role models out on the streets, where the first gangs began to take shape. 
 Perhaps no other law is as clearly pertinent to the formation of gangs in Cape 
Town as the Group Areas Act.  The passage of the Act had been debated for years, 
but it finally became law by the 1960s, when Cape Town's economy was receding 
from the earlier post-war boom.
177
  As jobs became scarce, government officials 
sought to control the stream of workers flooding into the city, and eradicate the 
overflowing coloured areas such as District Six.  A new layout for Cape Town was 
needed, and the ideas of a Frenchman by the name of Le Corbusier were extremely 
popular throughout the rest of the world. 
178
 
 Le Corbusier's visions for the modern urban city called for specific working 
class areas which were spread around the central city.
179
  These 'satellites' would 
contain the poor while at the same time giving them access to the city itself.  Le 
Corbusier advocated the formation of 'garden cities,' the name he gave for the 
working class townships.
180
  He is credited with planning modern working class 
dwellings and his ideas influenced the development of modern cities throughout the 
world, including the United States.
181  
His plans were actually used to build the 
housing projects within Chicago, as well, only to be criticized years later as a 
disaster in urban planning.  Le Corbusier's designs in Chicago isolated and 
entrapped residents, and helped to create the conditions that led to gang formation 
and violence within the city.
182
  At the height of his popularity, however, Le 
Corbusier's allegedly innovative designs were championed by government officials 
as a way of effectively dealing with the urban poor.  Cape Town had been similarly 
inspired by Le Corbusier's approach, and Cape Town government officials sought to 
imitate his work.  The architects of the newly envisioned Cape Town drew up plans 
for 'garden cities' to be erected around the outskirts of the city itself.  These 
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architects envisioned satellite townships that sprang away from the city centre.
183 
 
The garden cities were to be characterized by order and repetition.  They were to be 
self-contained, as well, with green spaces clearly delineating the boundaries of the 
townships.
184
  These green spaces served a dual purpose, as they also were a buffer 
between the city and the townships.  In effect, the green spaces could be utilized by 
the city's police and other security forces in the event of uprisings or riots from 
within the townships.
185
  The City threw itself behind the garden cities concept, and 
passed what was to be the third and final instalment of the Group Areas Act in 
1966.
186
  The Act forced coloured and black families to move from their homes 
within the city and to be relocated to the outskirts of town.  These towns were to be 
designated as 'non-white' areas and were to be self-governed by its residents.
187
  The 
city itself was to remain white.  Officials proclaimed that the removals would reduce 
any friction between blacks and whites.
188
 
 The overall effects of the removals were to be profound and long-lasting.  
The designated area that the coloured classes were moved to had previously been 
uninhabited and uncultivated land, known as the Cape Flats.  The idea of a garden 
city never materialized as the soil itself was of poor quality and mostly sandy, 
making it difficult for any type of vegetation to grow.
189
  In addition, the architects 
of the garden city envisioned residents to transport themselves to and from the city 
centre via an automobile; most of the working class had no such vehicle at their 
disposal.  They were effectively tied to their land as they lacked any kind of 
mobility.
190
  This lack of transport also made it difficult for people to get to their 
jobs and to find employment, as well.   
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 Another significant impact that led to the development of gangs, was the 
tearing apart of the extended family unit.  The garden city was built around the 
notion of a nuclear family, though most coloured families considered their families 
to be their extended support systems.
191
   Extended families were broken up and 
moved throughout the Cape Flats, and family members no longer lived in close 
proximity to one another.  The vital support that these families provided was gone, 
and parents had to rely on institutions to supervise their children while they were at 
work.
192
  If parents could not afford to pay these institutions, then children were 
commonly left on their own to fend for themselves.  The extended families helped to 
create a unique culture within the confines of District Six.
193  
The culture of District 
Six came with its own set of rules that helped to maintain order within the 
community.  Yet the Group Areas Act managed to not only destroy District Six, but 
this class culture, as well.  Without this culture, disorder and chaos ensued.  Despite 
the city's efforts, overcrowding in the Cape Flats was a common occurrence.  Flats 
would house multiple occupants, with limited, if any, private space available.
194
  
Children would be forced to stay out on the streets.  However, whereas in District 
Six children were familiar with the corner shops and the neighbours that lived 
around them, in the Cape Flats, everyone was a stranger, and children would seek 
out their peers in order to obtain some semblance of belonging.  
 The play groups that children formed centred around the blocks that they 
lived on or around the courtyards adjacent to their flats.  These groups served as 
substitutes for the children's own families, as most of their time was spent with these 
groups.
195
  As with their own families, children were fiercely loyal to one another 
and developed strong allegiances to their block.  As the children grew older, the play 
groups also changed to accommodate their needs.
196
  From simply playing with one 
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another, the youth became more defence-oriented and protective of their blocks, and 
defence of their block, their territory, was of the utmost importance.
197
  Modern day 
gangs rose from these early play groups.  Fierce battles over territory occurred on a 
daily basis, and the battles were often bloody.    
 The battles over territory expanded, as well.  Gangs fought over the right to 
be considered the most powerful gang.
198
  These gang battles further illustrate the 
common nature of the problem, as gangs in Chicago also fought vicious battles over 
turf.  For both Chicago and Cape Town gangs, in order to emerge on top, gangs 
became more organized and structured.  They involved themselves in illegal 
businesses and trade.
199
  Gangs first bought and sold firearms, but business 
expanded to the lucrative market of drug trafficking.  Millions were made by the 
high demand for drugs, and gang members became involved in the competition over 
who had the right to sell where.  In Cape Town, the former battles over territory no 
longer centred around the concept of defending one's family, but rather defending 
one's market.
200
  Gangs sought monopolies over the drug trade and competition 
between rival gangs often ended in violent fights, where innocent people were often 
caught in the crossfire.  The violence that gangs exhibited was also perpetuated by 
the fact that they themselves had been victims of violence committed by the Group 
Areas Act.
201
  Had it not been for the forced removals, these gang members would 
have retained the culture from which they had come from.  They also would have 
better access to the formal market and employment opportunities.
202
  With limited 
resources available to them, however, gangs were forced to survive using whatever 
means possible.   
3C: The Unique Influence of Prison Gang Culture on Hanover Park Street Gangs 
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 Though prison gangs are not unique to Cape Town or South Africa, the 
culture that is created by prison gangs is distinguishable from other prison gangs 
around the world.  The folklore, traditions, and rituals that are passed down between 
inmates are something akin to ancient cultures passing on the story of their people.  
In addition, South African prison gangs have, until recently, successfully been able 
to keep street gangs outside of the world of prison gangs.  What happened in the 
outside world did not cross into the realm of the prison gangs, and all that mattered 
was what happened while in prison.  This exclusive status sets prison gang members 
on a pedestal above regular gang members.  Their influence on the streets is vast and 
therefore CeaseFire must be able to access this world as well.
203
  It is necessary to 
expand on prison gang culture before explaining why any sustainable violence 
prevention initiative such as CeaseFire must include engaging this segment of the 
population.   
 Within South Africa, three major prison gangs dominate – the 26s, 27s, and 
the 28s.  These gangs credit a bandit by the name of Nongoloza with the formation 
of prison gang culture as it is today.
204
  Nongoloza initially formed a gang of robbers 
in the hills of Klipriversberg, near Johannesburg.  He organized this gang according 
to what he termed, “Nineveh law,” a name he derived from reading the Bible.
205
  
Nineveh laws gave hierarchy and structure to Nongoloza's men and these men grew 
in number.  When Nongoloza was first jailed at the end of the nineteenth century, he 
took his laws and recruited members to his gang within prison walls.  The traditions 
that have been carried on through generations are a combination of the laws that 
Nongoloza formulated, as well as rituals and folklore that have been added to 
recreate Nongoloza the man into Nongoloza the god, an idol worshiped throughout 
the centuries.
206
  The colourful and embellished tale of how Nongoloza formed the 
first prison gangs has been spread throughout South African prisons.   
 Only members of the prison gangs are privy to the entire tale of Nongoloza, 
and each gang adds its own interpretation and account to the story so as to 
differentiate itself from the other gangs.  Along with the story comes numerous 
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rituals and customs that are performed by members of the respective gangs, and each 
gang member has a specific role to carry out.
207
  Any member who reveals the 
traditions of the gang to non-members will be punished severely, even by death.  
This secrecy makes the prison gangs an elite group.  To become a part of this group, 
one must be initiated, but once a part of it; one is guaranteed all the protection and 
benefits that come with being a gang member.
208
  Because of the exclusivity of 
prison gangs, they were revered in the outside world.
209
  Street gangs sought to copy 
the traditions and incorporate the hierarchy and rituals into their own ways of life.  
However, these gangs lacked the immense body of knowledge regarding Nongoloza 
and his laws.  Nonetheless, the limited information that they did possess, they 
flaunted, by making new initiates undergo similar rituals and by seeking the 
friendships of prison gang members whom they encountered.   
 The two different forms of gangs remained separated from one another for 
decades, until the boom of the drug trade in the 1990s.  Gangsters who made a 
lucrative business selling drugs were able to use their cash to buy them favours in 
jail when they were arrested.
210
  Money was a source of power in prison, and 
gradually, gangsters were able to buy their way into the prison gangs.  These 
gangsters, who had previously limited knowledge of the prison gang culture, became 
high-ranking officers and learned the long-locked secrets of the prison gangs.
211
  
They took this information and blended it with their knowledge of street gang 
culture, appointing loyal street gang members into high positions within the Number 
gangs.  Whereas before it took a lifetime to achieve such status, pay-offs helped 
create a fast-track to respected positions.
212  
Ultimately, prison gangs became 
associated with street gangs, and a member of the Americans on the outside of 
prison knew that he would become a 26, should he go to prison.
213
  Prison gangs 
thus hugely influenced Cape Town gang culture. 


























 CeaseFire Hanover Park must tailor its program to also engage prison gang 
members, because once they are released from prison, they carry an enormous 
amount of respect and fear within the community.  These gangsters can become 
carriers of violence, and spread it throughout the community, thereby negating any 































Chapter 4: Creating a Holistic and Sustainable Approach with the Community 
 One of the main pillars of CeaseFire's model is to work with the community 
to tackle violence.  The program recognizes that no long-term solution can occur 
without everyone's cooperation, as gang violence is a complex community 
problem.
214
  As shown, the evolution of gang violence within the Cape Flats 
involved many different factors and occurred over decades to become what it is 
today.  It will take the efforts of numerous entities to work together to undo these 
factors.  For CeaseFire to buy into community mobilization, it must engage 
community stakeholders.  This chapter seeks to identify those stakeholders and the 
potential hindrances to cooperation that may arise.  In order to be successful, 
CeaseFire Hanover Park must address these obstacles.   
4A: Local Community Engagement 
4A-1: First Community Resource Centre 
 First Community Resource Centre, or FCRC, is the local site that hosts 
CeaseFire in Hanover Park.  The wide array of services that FCRC offers is a vital 
tool to utilize for the CeaseFire program.   FCRC is an independent not-for-profit 
and is located in the central hub of Hanover Park.  FCRC’s mission is to alleviate 
poverty by providing a range of services to residents of the Hanover Park 
community.
215
  The organisation is meant to address any social skills deficit within 
youth and teach youth important skills that will empower them to manage 
themselves so that they refrain from entering gangs or abusing drugs and alcohol.  
FCRC was the brainchild of Pastor Engel, who also runs the CeaseFire Project.
216
  
The idea came to fruition as a result of the community centre that was built using 
donations from the community, and specifically donations from the Pentecostal 
church within Hanover Park.  By partnering with FCRC, CeaseFire also forms 
alliances with the supporters of FCRC, such as the Pentecostal Church.  In addition, 
CeaseFire is privy to a whole network of community organisations through FCRC's 
connections.  FCRC employees 4-5 staff members who coordinate day-to-day affairs 
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  The organisation also heavily relies on the use of volunteers to 
facilitate programs and activities.  Programs are also run in conjunction with one 
another to promote a more integrated service approach.  These measures help keep 
costs manageable for the organisation, thereby creating more sustainable assistance 
to the community, as well.
218
  Sustainable assistance and long term investment 
within the community are aims that FCRC is dedicated to and the organisation also 
provides services that reflect these aims.  Forming a relationship with CeaseFire is 
beneficial to the FCRC, as well, since building such ties is central to FCRC's aims. 
 FCRC is involved in numerous programs, many of which could benefit 
CeaseFire's clients.  These services include career guidance, parent support groups, 
and counselling.  Many of these services are geared specifically towards the youth, 
as they are the segment of the population that need the most guidance within the 
community.  For example, the career guidance initiative offers courses and activities 
that help youth in choosing career paths.  Implementers of the program also offer 
advice on school subjects and what higher levels of education youth should 
pursue.
219
  They additionally give youth advice on how to obtain financial assistance 
for high education.  Having career counsellors in the same space as the CeaseFire 
program can serve as a positive influence on clients who may be deciding on what to 
do with their future.  Besides career counselling, FCRC offers computer training 
courses in Microsoft Office and using the Internet for school work.  Ten computers 
are available for the community’s benefit and four tutors help students and 
community members learn basic computer skills.
220
  Computer training is another 
way that youth can become better equipped to find a job and apply for higher 
education.  FCRC additionally provides training to ex-offenders, and encourages ex-
offenders to develop skills that will help them to successfully reintegrate back into 
society.
221
  FCRC's space gives CeaseFire clients a welcoming environment where 
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they can get away from street life, at least for a few hours, and work on improving 
job skills.
222
       
Therapeutic counselling is another huge component of the services that are 
offered at FCRC.  A wide variety of topics are addressed in therapy, such as 
spiritual, emotional, and financial issues.  Though staff makes it a point to always be 
available for community members; in order to obtain specialized counselling, FCRC 
contracts with other organisations and uses certified therapists.
223
  This service is 
essential for CeaseFire clients who often have the most need for therapy.  Moreover, 
because FCRC is interested in keeping children off the streets so that they will not 
be influenced to join a gang, the organisation provides a wide array of 
extracurricular activities for youth, as well.  Within the centre are pool tables, board 
games, and table tennis, which can be used when the centre is open, from 9 a.m. to 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday.
224
  Staff and volunteers also run various arts and 
cultural programs for children, which include conc rts and dance recitals.  When 
school is in session, FCRC uses volunteers to act as tutors for children, who are 
welcome to complete their homework at the centre, since oftentimes the home 
environment for children can be distracting to do work.   
Another major component of FCRC is its substance abuse program.  It 
entails a six-week camp which helps clients become clean and sober and provides 
them with skills to maintain sobriety.  Upon completion of the six weeks, clients are 
required to enrol in aftercare to ensure that they have the necessary support to stay 
clean.
225
  Many youth who are caught in the criminal justice system because of 
substance abuse are referred to FCRC as part of a diversion program.  These youth 
enter into FCRC's substance abuse program to achieve a clean and sober lifestyle.     
The wide variety of services available through FCRC fosters CeaseFire’s 
mission to offer a holistic and integrated approach to helping ‘at-risk’ youth.  As 
part of CeaseFire’s outreach workers’ efforts to link youth to other support systems 
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within the community, many referrals can be done directly to FCRC.  For example, 
youth who have trouble with drug abuse can become enrolled in the drug treatment 
program offered by FCRC.
226
  In addition, FCRC offers a safe space for troubled 
youth to come to should they want to escape the streets for a time.  Moreover, 
because the CeaseFire program is housed there, youth have the opportunity to talk to 
their caseworkers or violence interrupters while at the site.  Youth can also be 
exposed to FCRC staff and volunteers who can serve as positive influences.  The 
more such influences that these youth have, the more likely they will be steered 
towards making positive decisions in their lives.  The downside to being hosted by 
an organisation such as FCRC, however, is that it discourages CeaseFire from 
partnering with other neighbouring organisations.  Because FCRC contains all the 
necessary resources for youth within one space, outreach workers lose the incentive 
to build better relationships with the community.  These relationships could also 
possibly benefit the youth, as well.  Though FCRC is centrally located, at-risk youth 
may have a greater need to find an organisation that is more closely located to their 
home, especially if they have to cross rival gang territory to reach the site.  Further, 
other organisations may offer different approaches to helping youth, and without any 
incentive to reach out to them, workers may not have a chance to explore the 
services that such organisations may offer.   
4A-2: CASE 
Community Action for a Safer Environment, or CASE, shares a similar 
mission to CeaseFire and has the added benefit of having a well-respected reputation 
within the community.  CASE was formed by a local Hanover Park resident and is 
therefore considered to be an organic initiative to address violence.
227
 The 
organisation utilizes volunteers to run specific services targeted to those impacted by 
the cycle of violence.  Primarily, CASE attempts to deal with the root causes of 
violence and its effects on the perpetrators and victims of such violence.  The main 
focus is on youth.  However, CASE's interventions incorporate the entire 
community, including police, teachers, parents, and students.
228
  The organisation 
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spearheads two main initiatives, the Training and Personal Development program 
and the Community Projects Development program.   
The Training and Personal Development program aims to help people deal 
with violence in an appropriate manner by assisting individuals with addressing their 
own trauma first.  The program is geared towards both adults and youth, where 
adults are given counselling training, personal development courses, and 
mentoring.
229
  The adults are also encouraged to recruit and train new volunteers.  
As part of the TPD program, 'youth in action' targets youth by providing life skills 
training and workshops based on youth needs.   Recruitment and mentoring is also 
included in this category.  Once through the TPD program, participants become the 
leader of the Community Development program.  Community Development centres 
on the establishment of support groups.  These support groups are tailored to 
specific needs, such as trauma, parent support, and therapeutic support within the 
community.
230
   
Another important component to CASE's program is its insistence that 
counsellors be brought into schools in a structured way, by being a constant 
presence within the school – up to 30 hours per week.  Students thus have a regular 
and consistent access to support, crisis management, and on-going treatment.
231
  The 
trauma work is incorporated into the life skills courses in all South African schools.  
CASE also has partnered with the National Institute for Crime Prevention and 
Reintegration of Offenders – NICRO – to provide support groups for youth who are 
in the criminal justice system.  Other ways that CASE has been able to reach out to 
the community is by providing the 'Care for Carer' program, where staff reach out to 
police and community workers to help them better cope with the trauma that they 
regularly experience.
232
  The program aims to prevent burn-out, which is crucial to 
stopping violence on a community-wide scale.   
A partnership with CASE would have numerous benefits for CeaseFire, the 
least of which includes giving CeaseFire a more legitimate and reputable image 
within the community.  Because CASE has been in the community for years, and its 
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programs are seen as having a positive impact within the community, its 
endorsement of CeaseFire would bolster the work that CeaseFire is attempting to do.  
Further, CeaseFire's clients could benefit immensely from the services that are 
offered by CASE.    CASE's mentorship and tutoring program is yet another way 
that gang members who are trying to reform can become a more positive role model 
for younger children who look up to these high-risk individuals.  Also, the trauma 
that CeaseFire's clients undergo could be adequately addressed in a program such as 
CASE.  CASE focuses on hiring experts and has qualified staff to help deal with 
such trauma.  This service is especially vital because CeaseFire outreach workers do 
not have such training, and have numerous other responsibilities towards their 
clients, so that they cannot address the trauma in an adequate manner.
233
  Finally, 
CASE services can be beneficial to CeaseFire staff themselves.  Interrupters and 
outreach workers regularly enter into crisis situations and there is a danger of 
burning out from the work.  Programs such as the 'Care for Carer' initiative are 
specifically tailored to help staff deal with these pressures.     
4B: City Government Engagement 
4B-2: VPUU 
Community partnersh p is multi-faceted, in that alliances must be formed 
with different segments of the community, including the local government.  Thus, 
while CeaseFire must partner with organisations such as CASE, it also must look to 
outside organisations to strengthen community involvement.  One such organisation 
that CeaseFire is involved with is The Violence Prevention through Urban 
Upgrading program, or VPUU.  VPUU was established in 2006 by The City of Cape 
Town.  The VPUU program is aimed at social, situational and institutional crime 
prevention and links urban upgrading with a wide variety of social interventions.
234
  
The program's concept starts from the premise that a sustainable, safe, and integrated 
human settlement can be achieved through the combination of capital infrastructure 
projects, socio-economic improvements and institutional capacity.  In order to prove 
that this theory is effective, four safe node areas were selected for the program's 
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   VPUU works within the targeted areas to first analyse the crime 
situation and then come up with a sustainable solution.  A baseline survey is done to 
assess the current situation within the target area.  Once that is complete, the 
program works with community members and committees to prioritise the 
community's needs.  Based on these actions, a strategy of interventions is developed.  
The strategy is called the community action plan.  In this plan, the local knowledge 
is paired with expert knowledge and resources from external sources to overcome 
the community's problems, namely the social, cultural, economic and institutional 
exclusion.
236
These four types of exclusion are the fundamental causes of crime and 
violence.  The community action plan establishes time-frames for when projects are 
to be implemented and local structures set up.  Any existing projects or structures 
are also strengthened to assist with implementation, governance, operation, and 
maintenance to ensure long-term sustainability.  A suitable monitoring system is 
agreed upon so as to continuously evaluate the progress of the program and its 
overall impact on crime and safety.
237
  VPUU emphasizes the importance of creating 
well-managed community spaces and project interventions.  It relies on local 
organisations to manage these spaces. 
The community action plan should ideally have crime prevention strategies 
to address the four types of exclusion.  For example, situational crime relates to the 
space and environment where crime breeds.
238
  Neighbourhoods that are unkempt, 
with many abandoned buildings and poor lighting are common places for crime to 
occur.  Situational crime prevention addresses this through urban design, managing 
abandoned buildings, providing adequate street lighting, and landscaping.  Similarly, 
institutional crime prevention involves community upkeep and includes managing 
and maintenance of public facilities, leadership development, and economic 
development.
239
  These crime prevention strategies underlie three themes advocated 
by VPUU – longer term crime prevention, protection and support for victims of 
crime, and community-building.  VPUU identifies stakeholders who have an interest 
in the design, implementation, and management of crime prevention initiatives 
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within the targeted communities.  These stakeholders vary, and can be from the 
public, private sector, or from the community itself.
240
  The Hanover Park 
Stakeholder Forum was created in 2010 by the Western Cape Government 
Community Safety – Social Crime Prevention Initiative to address the increased 
gang violence in the area.  Initially, the forum consisted of only Community 
Policing Forum representatives, but has since expanded and includes a broader range 
of participants from different sections of society.
241
  For example, stakeholders 
include the City of Cape Town Sub-Councils in Hanover Park, the City of Cape 
Town Ward Councillors and Ward Committees in Hanover Park, various civic 
organisations, community based organisations and faith-based organisations, local 
street and area committees.  They meet at least once a month.  These stakeholders 
also form part of what is called the Safe Node Areas Committee – SNAC – which 
leads the design, implementation, and management for the safe nodes area.   
Because of the amount of funding that it is giving to the CeaseFire program, 
VPUU has a vested interest in its outcomes.  Therefore, monthly meetings regularly 
occur between VPUU representatives and CeaseFire staff.  These meetings update 
the government on how the program is progressing and any potential concerns or 
issues are raised at these meetings.  In addition, monthly reports are submitted to 
VPUU.
242
  CeaseFire is part of a larger initiative headed by VPUU that aims to 
reduce crime and violence and to ensure that youth get an adequate social, academic, 
and moral foundation.  This can be achieved by partnering with local organisations 
to build strong social bonds and trust.  VPUU also hopes to build a recreational area 
for young people, such as a sports facility with a youth centre.
243
  This will be taken 
up with the stakeholders and possibly incorporated into a community action plan.  
VPUU aims to utilize the participants of CeaseFire's outreach work program to 
facilitate these projects.  Using these high-risk youth will foster their leadership and 
team-building skills.  Another benefit of partnering with VPUU is CeaseFire's role 
in forming the community action plan.  The action plan sets the course of initiatives 
in the community, and CeaseFire's partnership with VPUU can help steer the action 
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plan into prioritizing a specific violence prevention strategy.  Because the 
community action plan relies on the involvement of the entire community, a 
sustainable and holistic violence prevention campaign can be more readily achieved.   
However, CeaseFire must be careful not to become embroiled in local 
politics through its affiliation with VPUU.  VPUU is a city department that is 
backed by a DA government, whereas other organisations that CeaseFire partners 
with are affiliated with the ANC-backed national government.  Having to navigate 
political alliances is a wasteful way to spend CeaseFire's resources.
244
  Therefore, 
the organisation must take steps to remain politically neutral.  In addition, CeaseFire 
relies heavily on funding from VPUU.  In order to maintain more independence, 
CeaseFire must build upon its other community relationships.      
4C: The Police and Police Affiliations 
4C-1: SAPS and Metro Police 
CeaseFire Hanover Park has a limited relationship with the police, as gangs 
are extremely distrustful of the police.  Yet the model lists the criminal justice 
system as one of its pillars to curing violence.
245
  Without developing better ties with 
the police, CeaseFire loses out on a potentially vital resource.  Briefly, Hanover Park 
has two different police bodies, the South African Police Service – SAPS – which is 
the national police institution, and the city police, or Metro Police.  In theory, both 
are meant to work together to reduce crime within the area.  However, in reality, 
politics does play a part in their relationship.
246
  SAPS is run by an ANC 
government, whereas the Metro Police are supervised by a DA-led local 
government.  When the police are blamed for inadequate responses to crime, each 
organisation tends to blame the other and the political parties that they are affiliated 
with.  Despite the tensions, both police departments have agreed to work together to 
form roadblock searches and seizures, and to conduct raids on suspected drug dens.  
The local police station that is responsible for Hanover Park is located in Philipi.
247
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Under the original Chicago-based model, the police form an integral part of the 
strategy to reduce violence.  The law enforcement in Hanover Park has also 
attempted to take steps to reduce gang-violence.  For example, SAPS is focused on 
promoting increased police presence in identified crime hotspots within Hanover 
Park, as well as around high-risk schools.
248
  Yet despite these efforts, the police and 
the community have a strained relationship.
249
  The police are seen as promoting 
their own agenda without regard to the community's input on how crime should be 
addressed.
250
  Their actions can make situations worse, such as when they arrest 
gang members who are vital to the community's efforts at facilitating peace talks.
251
  
In addition, some police officers, including high ranking officials, refuse to talk to 
gang members, saying that they are not afforded any special status within society.   
As part of the efforts to promote a more harmonious relationship, the 
Community Policing Forum has agreed to participate in the Employment Promotion 
program located at the Philippi SAPS office so as to monitor police service delivery.  
One way that CeaseFire can build its relationship with the police is by also 
providing input on how the police carry out their duties in the community.  They can 
serve as a link between gang members and the police.  Another vital role that 
CeaseFire can play is educating the police about the issues that gang members 
struggle with, and focusing police tactics on curing violence, instead of on 
eradicating gangs.  Finally, CeaseFire can also work with the Community Policing 
Forum to monitor police service delivery.  
4C-2: Community Policing Forum 
 The Community Policing Forum consists of local community members who 
represent a wide range of community sectors, including organisations and 
institutions such as schools, ratepayers associations, civic organisations, businesses 
and religious institutions.
252
  The members work together with the local police in 
order to create and maintain a safe environment for citizens living in the CPF's area. 
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The CPF develops annual community safety plans, which identify priorities and 
needs for the area.
253
  The community safety plan is meant to form part of the local 
police station's operational plan.  In theory, a CPF may also plan and implement its 
own safety projects, and can apply to the government for funding for these 
projects.
254
  In reality however, many CPFs, including the one in Hanover Park, 
must rely on its own revenue stream to fund projects.  Station Commissioners of 
local police stations are responsible for establishing CPFs in their areas and almost 
all police station areas in the Western Cape have a CPF. Each CPF has its own 
constitution and goals, and may also have Sub-Forums with specific aims.  An 
Executive Committee of the CPF has to be elected regularly, and the Station 
Commissioner must always be a member of the Executive Committee.  Neither the 
chairperson nor deputy-chairperson of the CPF may be a police officer.  
 The Hanover Park CPF receives no funding from the government, though 
they are very active within the community.  They have a vested interest in crime 
prevention and had attended the initial training held by CeaseFire for the area.
255
  
They had hoped to implement the program, or at the very least, have a prominent 
role.  However, a preliminary baseline survey of Hanover Park youth indicated that 
most high-risk youth were very cautious of the CPF, and did not trust them.  The 
members of the CPF were viewed as working with the police and were seen as 
police informers, who reported any actions that were considered suspect.  Such 
assumptions were supported by incidents that were initiated by the CPF to broker 
peace between gangs and the community.  Gang members would attempt to work 
with CPF to foster a truce, only to be arrested days later by the local police.  Though 
no evidence exists that the CPF were actually involved in the gang member's arrests, 
it led to much distrust with the area gangs.
256
  Because gaining the youth's trust was 
essential to successfully implementing the plan, FCRC decided against having CPF 
involved in establishing CeaseFire.  This has caused friction between the two 
organisations, with CPF criticising the program and accusing the program of hiring 
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people who are not reputable within the community.
257
  Again, CPF did not have a 
say in who would be hired as violence interrupters or outreach workers.   
 Most of the tension, however, has been over funding.  CPF hoped that it 
could work with CeaseFire to distribute the funds more evenly between the two 
organisations, as they both shared similar objectives.  Prior to CeaseFire's 
implementation, the head of the CPF stated that the City had denied meeting with 
them to discuss the model and its implementation.  They had repeatedly asked to 
meet with the Mayor, but their requests allegedly fell on deaf ears.  According to the 
head of CPF, Anthony Daniels, the CPF had mediated several peace pacts and 
ceasefires before the program was even discussed.
258
  Therefore, in the minds of the 
members of the CPF, it seemed a natural progression to be awarded funding for 
something that they already were a part of. 
 The CPF is made of active community residents who are interested in 
keeping their community safe.  Typically, the CPF is portrayed in the media as anti-
gang, and the CPF and gangs are often pitted against one another, causing the 
community to become fragmented.
259
  Therefore, CeaseFire must strive to form a 
more stable partnership with them, in order to utilize a more holistic approach to 
cure violence.  Without a better relationship with the CPF, CeaseFire may be viewed 
as biased towards working only with gang members, which leads to a question of its 
legitimacy.  CeaseFire must bring gang members and the CPF together to lessen the 
distrust that each side has for the other.  
4D: External Organisations 
4D-1: Trauma Centre 
 The Trauma Centre is located in Woodstock and states as its mission that it 
aims to provide psychosocial services to survivors of social crime, political violence, 
torture and other cruel and degrading treatment. They also focus on frontline 
workers who are exposed daily to trauma caused by violence, and provide these 
workers with avenues to combat trauma and burn-out.
260
  The Trauma Centre is 
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another resource that CeaseFire can utilize to help clients address the violence that 
they experience on a daily basis.  More importantly, however, the Trauma Centre 
serves as an important resource for CeaseFire staff.  Violence interrupters willingly 
put themselves in potentially traumatic experiences on a daily basis.  As conflict 
mediators, they bear a huge responsibility to calm people down enough to find 
alternative solutions to disputes.
261
  Yet despite their roles, shootings and gang 
killings still occur, and often, the interrupters are personally acquainted with the 
individual who gets shot.  In addition, the temptation to relapse is constantly around 
them and they themselves do not have an extensive enough social support system to 
help them address these struggles.  To compound this problem, due to the 
confidential nature of their work, interrupters and outreach workers cannot talk to 
just anyone in their community.   A specialized counsellor is needed to help them 
address the trauma they experience.  Further, a specialized counsellor must maintain 
confidentiality.  Organisations such as the Trauma Centre are therefore vital in 
ensuring that CeaseFire staff is able to handle the challenges of their line of work.   
The CeaseFire team sees a counsellor at the Trauma Centre once a month.
262
  The 
fact that the Centre is not located in Hanover Park also acts as an additional 
safeguard to protect the confidential nature of the CeaseFire staff's work.  By seeing 
a therapist within the community, there is a risk that the counsellor will be 
acquainted with the people that staff may mention in sessions.  Having a counsellor 
who did not grow up in nor is familiar with the people or the environment allows 
interrupters and outreach workers to speak more freely about their issues.     
 Overall, CeaseFire has begun the process of integrating various community 
organisations together under the common goal of eradicating violence.  The model 
recognises that gang violence is a complex, multi-faceted problem, and each 
community organisation has its own set of strengths that can be used to address the 
issue.
263
  Only by combining these strengths can a long-term solution manifest itself.       
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Chapter 5: Problems and Prospects 
 The CeaseFire model can work within Hanover Park.  However, there are 
several factors that must be taken into consideration as CeaseFire moves forward 
with the pilot program.  The following is a list of such factors.  It is by no means 
exhaustive, but rather serves as a starting point for more thoroughly adapting the 
program to suit the community's needs.   
5A: Acceptance of violence in the community 
 For decades, violence has been a part of the history and life of Hanover Park.  
This violence has become intertwined with other aspects of living and many 
individuals have become disheartened by the issue, saying that there is not much that 
can be done, except avoid dangerous areas as best as one can.
264
  Many residents 
also feel that they are not being heard, and that the city prioritizes the needs of other 
communities first.  Moreover, numerous initiatives have already been introduced 
into the area, yet few are long-lasting.  The community must be galvanized to take 
action, as that is a focal point to CeaseFire's strategy.  Community members must 
have some active role to play in reducing violence, as well.  By making it a priority 
to host more community events, where members are encouraged to speak out and 
discuss their trauma, community apathy will be decreased.  Examples of such events 
include the prayer vigils that occur after shootings, as well as community rallies that 
carry the message that violence will no longer be tolerated.
265
  Furthermore, more 
events that bring the community together with gang members will help humanize the 
situation, as both sides can put concrete faces on the issue.  Community members 
will be able to talk to the gang members they feel have inflicted the violence, and 
gang members will see who they are affecting through their actions.   
5B: Credibility in the Community 
  Another problem is the perception that CeaseFire staff has within the 
community.  Several staff is former gang members, and some interrupters were part 
of the number gang while in prison.  Though CeaseFire is very clear that anyone 
who was associated with gangs must now be reformed, the program still draws 
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criticism for its hiring practices.  In particular, CeaseFire Hanover Park does not use 
many of the safeguards that CeaseFire Chicago uses.  CeaseFire Hanover Park does 
not conduct drug testing on its clients, nor do they have a minimum education 
requirement.  CeaseFire rather relies on the candidate's reputation within the 
community, and particularly on the opinions of the gangs they work with.  In effect, 
CeaseFire relies upon word-of-mouth and the client's assurances that they have 
renounced their past affiliations and gang ties.  Community members are sceptical 
that reform has actually occurred, especially because they feel that they have little to 
no input on who gets hired.    In addition, CeaseFire makes it a point to clarify that 
the organisation is not anti-gang, it is rather anti-violence.  For many community 
residents, however, gangs are the main source of the problem and therefore should 
be broken up and its members locked away.  An extreme example of this sentiment 
was in the formation of PAGAD, a vigilante group who resorted to killing 
particularly violent gang members.  Though support for this organisation was short-
lived, it crystallises the sentiment that people within the Cape Flats have towards 
gangs.
266
  Police officers have also shown their unwillingness to cooperate with 
gangs, as they are seen as untrustworthy, violent skollies.
267
  CeaseFire Hanover 
Park must take steps to change the c mmunity's perception of gangs and the 
popularly held belief that, 'once a gangster, always a gangster.'  Forums geared 
towards addressing the topic should be open to all community residents and 
interrupters and outreach workers should attend community events that are 
sponsored by other organisations, including churches.  Only by changing the 
community's perception of gang-members can CeaseFire hope to gain community 
support.   
5C: Lack-of Funding for Community Organisations 
 Another bar to community support is the fact that CeaseFire has been 
awarded a huge contract with the government.  While other organisations struggle to 
find funding to keep themselves afloat, CeaseFire has been given R9 million over 
the span of 3 years.
268
  For the duration of these three years, the program will not 
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have to worry about where the money will come from.  In addition, they get the 
city's support and guidance in managing the program.
269
  This has fostered 
resentment within the community, as local organisations, some of whom have been 
around for decades, have felt that their work has gone largely unnoticed by the city.  
While some organisations have distanced themselves from working with CeaseFire, 
other local organisations have agreed to partner with the program in the hopes of 
obtaining CeaseFire's funding for their own projects and initiatives.   
 The CPF is one such organisation that had initially expressed hostility 
towards the city for not engaging them in talks about how the R9 million was to be 
spent within the community, only to later attempt to work with CeaseFire with the 
expectation of using some of the funds to support their own initiatives.
270
  The CPF 
prided itself on working within the community long before CeaseFire, in order to 
maintain peace between warring gangs.
271
  Without any funds, other than the money 
from their own pockets, the CPF attempted to bring gang members together to 
discuss a truce.  Once the CeaseFire model was given government money, CPF 
members sought to be hired by the program to continue peace efforts.  The result has 
been that the overarching goal of stopping violence within the community has been 
pushed aside due to feelings of bitterness and resentment.  The CeaseFire program 
must clearly explain to community organisations such as CPF how the money is 
being used and invite these organisations to find creative ways where they can all 
work together to reduce violence.  CeaseFire cannot be seen as the cash cow that 
will fund all initiatives within the neighbourhood.   
5D: Politics 
 Party politics plays a huge role throughout different sectors of South African 
society, and its effects can be felt even at the grassroots level of community 
mobilization.  CeaseFire's contract was awarded by the city of Cape Town, which is 
currently led by the DA political party.  However, CeaseFire's aim is to include 
different community stakeholders into the process of curing violence in Hanover 
Park.  This includes involving members of the opposing party, the ANC.  Navigating 
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these relationships can be difficult, for example, when trying to work with SAPS, 
whose ties with the ANC -led national government can cause them to oppose 
decisions put forth by the city or by the Metro Police, which is governed by the city.  
In addition, CeaseFire has to also address power struggles with local politicians, 
such as Hanover Park's ward councillor.  Though currently the councillor is a DA 
politician, because he is in charge of representing the community, he desires to have 
a say in the programs that are run within his area.  Because CeaseFire is a 
massively-funded and media-attracting campaign, the ward councillor desires to 
have some input on how it is managed.  CeaseFire is not a political organisation, 
however, and it should take care not to repeat the problems that CeaseFire Chicago 
experienced when dealing with political parties.
272
  By aligning itself too close with 
either the ANC or the DA, CeaseFire may create a perception of political allegiance, 
which again causes the community to lose sight of the main message.      
5E: Not a community-inspired solution 
 Local organisations such as CASE and the CPF have worked in Hanover 
Park for years, and have earned praise for their work.  Their efforts are considered to 
be the model of local, sustainable grassroots mobilization.  In contrast, CeaseFire is 
a model that has been proven to work in a different country, with different cultural 
standards and norms.  The criticism with the model being implemented in Hanover 
Park is that already-existing community models should be given government support 
so that they can continue to grow and revitalise the community.  Local organisations 
are run by active community members, who are extremely knowledgeable with the 
issues that affect their community, and have shown a commitment to invest in the 
community.  By funding a foreign program, the government turns its back on the 
efforts that are already being made to better Hanover Park.  Both the government 
and CeaseFire must address this tension and secure partnerships beyond FCRC.  
CeaseFire must also establish its image within the community, and highlight the 
work that it is doing for the area.  A media campaign that emphasises how the model 
relates to the community would also be a beneficial avenue to pursue.  Finally, 
CeaseFire must educate residents on the universality of the problem of gang 
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violence.  Though CeaseFire may be a foreign approach, the problems that Hanover 
Park faces are similar to a problem shared with other communities.     
5F: Relationship with the Police 
 Unlike CeaseFire Chicago, CeaseFire Hanover Park does not have an 
established relationship with the local police authorities, as evidenced by the fact 
that the police do not have any input as to who gets hired as an interrupter.   Though 
CeaseFire Hanover Park meets with high ranking SAPS and Metro Police officers, 
these officers do not have the familiarity with the area that local police officers 
based in the area do, and can only offer limited feedback on what the community 
actually needs.  The perception of the police is one of hostility, as they themselves 
admit that they are reluctant to talk to gangsters, citing that gang members should be 
arrested and locked up if they partake in criminal activities.
273
  In addition, a widely 
held belief exists that corrupt officers are paid off by local, powerful gang 
members.
274
  These conditions make it difficult for CeaseFire staff to build strong 
ties to the police.
275
  The police are still a vital part of the community, and are still 
called upon when crime occurs.  Therefore, CeaseFire must maintain a relationship 
at the grassroots level with the police.     
5G: Maintaining Confidentiality 
 Though the police have agreed to partner with CeaseFire, they remain 
committed to apprehending gang-members suspected of engaging in wrongdoing.  
Outreach workers often work with gang members who engage in illegal activities.  
They build trusting relationships with these individuals and encourage them to make 
healthier choices without trying to judge or condemn the choices that they have 
already made.
276
  As part of CeaseFire's efforts to document interactions for data 
collection, workers record their interactions, as well.  Yet outreach workers cannot 
obstruct justice should the police or prosecution demand access to their records and 
obtain the authority to gain that access.  To get around this, workers have used 
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aliases to identify clients and tried to keep the knowledge of their client's identities 
out of their paperwork.   
 The other side of this, however, is that caseworkers can act as advocates in 
court for their clients.  Workers are unsure if they should be present during their 
client's court hearings.  Oftentimes however, outreach workers are the closest 
support that these youth have, since many youth come from broken homes where 
parents do not have the time for families.
277
  Workers are also privy to information 
about the client that may be useful to the judge, yet they are unsure how to best 
proceed within a court of law.  CeaseFire should develop ties with an attorney who 
is familiar with court procedures to help the organisation's staff navigate through the 
legal process.  CeaseFire can also develop ties with organisations such as Legal Aid 
and NICRO.  Both organisations have extensive knowledge about the criminal 
justice system and could advise CeaseFire on how to protect their client's 
confidentiality while also best helping them in court.   
5H: Support for Interrupters 
 Other than the basic training that is given to them before starting, the 
interrupters do not have any additional training in conflict mediation and trauma 
counselling.  They must rely on their street skills to manoeuvre dangerous and 
violent situations, often with people they are familiar with in the community.
278
  In 
addition, they face a lot of the pressure that comes with a pilot program that garners 
much media attention.  Because interrupters are an integral part of the model, the 
interrupters do carry an additional responsibility, as the public associates shooting 
statistics with the work that the interrupters do.  However, despite all their efforts, 
shootings and killings still occur, and these incidents have an impact on the 
interrupters.   Moreover, the interrupters must strive to maintain their image within 
the public as reformed gang members.  The interrupters need support to help them 
struggle with the day-to-day pressures of their line of work.  However, to exacerbate 
the issue, the interrupters cannot discuss their work with their family and loved ones 
because of the confidential nature of the program.  The interrupters are contracted to 
work with a counsellor once a month at the Trauma Centre.  However, seeing a 
















counsellor once a month for an hour or two merely scratches the surface of the 
issues that the interrupters carry.  In addition, the limited time they spend with the 
counsellor inhibits them from further establishing a trusting relationship so that the 
interrupters can comfortably share their problems.  CeaseFire should hire an on-call 
therapist, who is able to meet with the staff on a more regular basis, such as once a 
week or once every two weeks.  Being able to see a professional therapist more 
often will give interrupters the added support that they need to continue to do the job 
and avoid burn-out.  
5I: The Prospects for Sustainability and Violence Reduction 
 Despite the challenges that CeaseFire faces, it can be effective in Hanover 
Park.  Gang violence calls for the entire community to engage in a solution, and the 
model is one of the few that actively endorses working extensively with gang 
members.
279
  CeaseFire is innovative in its approach to gangs, as it breaks away 
from the traditional view of merely calling for more community involvement and 
tougher law enforcement.  The model recognises that gang members need support to 
help them make decisions to stop engaging in violent behaviour, and it provides that 
support in the form of outreach workers and interrupters.  By developing stronger 
ties with the community and other interested partners, CeaseFire can help 
incorporate gang members into the discussion on how to end violence.   
 In conclusion, gang violence is not merely a problem that is relegated to one 
part of the world.  It is a global issue, and numerous international organisations and 
initiatives have come together to combat it.
280
  Because of the universality of the 
problem, it is necessary to share approaches amongst different communities.  As 
Hanover Park's own history shows, many factors contribute to the emergence of 
such violence, and it will take a combination of approaches and community 
involvement to eradicate the disease.   CeaseFire takes the nature of the problem and 
offers a whole new lens from which to view it.  By viewing violence as a disease, it 
takes the blame away from gang members as the perpetrators, and instead views 
them as the carriers of violence.
281
  Gang members must be treated, so as to get rid 
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of the disease, but the real evil itself is violence.
282
   CeaseFire's approach includes 
gang members in the solution, and avoids dividing communities between sides, 
where one belongs to gangs and their supporters, and the other side belongs to the 
community and law enforcement.  Only by including every member of society as a 
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